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Abstract 
 The goal of this project is to develop indicators of a cyber-attack by applying a new data 
analysis technique known as Topological Data Analysis on synthetic cyber data. In particular, 
the research and work completed throughout this paper centers around an open-source 
implementation, called Python Mapper, that helps users globally view forensic data and gain 
qualitative insights from the shape of the data. To assist in these efforts, we developed tools to 
directly import data into Mapper from existing data sources. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
project and the method, the outcome of the work completed was not developing new cyber 
analytics of malicious activity but creating a stopping point in the research where future 
collaborators can build off of our work.  
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Executive Summary 
In this age of technological advances in computing and anonymous access to 
overwhelming amounts of information, cyber threats are prevalent on a national scale. In 2010, 
cyber security experts witnessed the first modern cyber warfare weapon called Stuxnet, a 
sophisticated cyber weapon that targeted a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran. With the 
upcoming release of the motion picture The Interview in 2015, there was a data breach within 
Sony Pictures that led to the release of employee confidential information and files for a number 
of Sony movies onto the Internet. There have been other cyber incidences such as the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) data breach and the cyber-attacks on Twitter and Netflix. With 
advanced persistent threats, malware, and phishing plaguing cyberspace, there is no all-
encompassing method to discern normal users from malicious actors. However, utilizing data 
analytics is an attempt to generalize such behaviors of suspicious activity in order to promote 
informed and efficient decision-making, otherwise known as cyber threat intelligence.  
Residing within the realm of Big Data, cyber data or event log data can be complex and 
highly dimensional consisting of host names, ID numbers, command-line commands, and 
various other fields. This complexity and high-dimensionality introduces many problems in 
addition to traditional roadblocks with large datasets. Topological Data Analysis (TDA) gives 
rise to methods that extract and highlight topological features in order to summarize the data. 
The idea is that data possesses shape that may convey meaningful information. With its origins 
from combinatorics, discrete geometry, linear algebra, and topology, TDA methods use three 
invariants studied in topology to capture the shape of the data [Chintakunta, 2016]. First 
introduced by Gurjeet Singh, Gunnar Carlsson, and Facundo Memoli, the Mapper algorithm is a 
method for Topological Data Analysis, emphasizing the goal of giving shape to data and 
interpreting this shape [Singh, 2007]. This method looks to build a compressed representation of 
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data to highlight the significant features. The Mapper algorithm achieves this result by using 
topological ideas that preserve closeness or similarities but alter distances of large magnitude. 
The Python Mapper is an implementation of the Mapper algorithm written with a graphical user 
interface that enables beginners to quickly acquaint themselves with its many features such as 
filter selection and node coloring options.  
The cyber data discussed throughout this paper is a product of the BRAWL project; 
BRAWL is an abbreviation for Blue versus Red Agent War-game Evaluation. As the name 
implies, there are two competitors in the cyber game; the red team agents simulate cyber 
intrusions while blue team agents have the task of detecting this malicious activity and 
developing analytics for that behavior. These games occur on a hyper-sensing network that 
generates data and records logs of network activity in real-time. After each BRAWL cyber game, 
the output is a multitude of indicators that highlight malicious behavior or by-products of red 
team activity. These indicators are stored in the Cyber Analytic Repository (CAR) for further 
study and testing, no matter how trivial or groundbreaking. The overall goal of applying the 
Mapper to this data was to gain qualitative understanding of the data from a different 
perspective. 
Methodology 
 The primary goal of this project is the design and implementation of a system that 
combined the capabilities of the Python Mapper with the ability to pull data directly from a cloud 
repository for forensic data. Once completed, carrying out case studies on the cyber data, testing 
different filters and observing the outcomes formed the general procedure in evaluating the 
software system. The final step, afterwards, was to explore the visualizations based on criteria 
tailored to this project.  
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Results and Conclusions 
 This work has been largely exploratory so far and the visualizations included in this 
report need careful study (based on TDA) to understand the results. There are four primary 
findings resulting from research and experimenting with the case studies.  
1. The dimensionality of the data can be reduced by removing all fields except the Data Model 
fields. Doing so does not result in the loss of information. 
2. Loops in the visualizations of each case study confirm some cyclic behavior prevalent in the 
cyber data.  
3. Often, there were too many noisy or non-malicious data points to conclude whether or not 
these loop features indicated malicious behavior.  
4. Further study of the TDA approach using the cyber data requires instances of malicious 
behavior in the data set. 
Future work should build upon these findings to progress towards developing cyber 
analytics for cyber threat intelligence. One direction for further study would be to incorporate 
machine learning into the Mapper workflow. In terms of filtering, a model trained using a 
machine-learning algorithm and labeled cyber data can act as a filter function for assigning 
numerical scores to each data point based on likelihood of malicious intent. Of course, data 
preparation should entail labeling each data point on whether or not it was a blue team or red 
team member. Once new indicators of attack have been created from analysis, a new model 
trained using these indicators would act as part of a cyber detection system. Another idea for 
future work is developing a better data transformation that would highlight the purpose of each 
data point and its impact on the network; the user should be able to each data point in relation to 
type and obtain a quick overview of network activity. Although transforming the data into 
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continuous vectors using available cyber analytics, this transformation was only one way of 
incorporating meaning into each data point   
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1 Introduction 
In this age of technological advances in computing and anonymous access to 
overwhelming amounts of information, cyber threats are prevalent on a national scale. In 2010, 
cyber security experts witnessed the first modern cyber warfare weapon called Stuxnet, a 
sophisticated cyber weapon that targeted a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran. Its mission 
was to search for specific software that monitored and controlled the programmable logic 
controllers of the nuclear centrifuges, intercept communication, and sabotage the centrifuges 
[Langner, 2011]. This program was the first of its kind to physically damage hardware while 
remaining undetected. In 2015, with the upcoming release of the motion picture The Interview, 
there was a cyber-attack on Sony Pictures that led to the release of employee confidential 
information and files for a number of Sony movies onto the Internet. After several days and 
various warnings/threats from a cyber terrorist group, the attacks took advantage of file-sharing 
hubs to distribute Sony files, film contracts, personal information on celebrities, and employee 
health records [Haggard, 2015]. There have been other incidents in which adversaries have 
stolen data without detection; these adversaries, however, hide within the network for long 
periods of time and steal much larger volumes of data. These attacks showcase the need to 
strengthen defenses against cyber threats. 
The European Union Agency of Network and Information Security (ENISA), a center of 
network and information security expertise, released a report titled ENISA Threat Landscape 
2015 to summarize the trends and prominence of current cyber threats. In ascending order, the 
top ten cyber threats of 2015 were malware, web-based attacks, web application attacks, botnets, 
denial of service, physical damage/theft, insider threat, phishing, spam, and exploit kits. As noted 
in the report, major actors for these threats consisted of cyber criminals and terrorists, insiders, 
online social hackers, nations/states, corporations, and hacktivists [Marinos, 2016]. Trends for 
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the top three threats were increasing in 2015. Aside from this report, other 
companies/corporations specializing in cyber security also released similar annual summaries 
that describe their findings of these attacks and provide a brief list of mitigation techniques for 
each one.   
The purpose of data analytics is to gain insight from information represented in the form 
of records, graphs, or text by observing and extracting important features. For example, a U.S 
retailer used analytic methods to observe consumer-purchasing behavior. Through this process, 
the retailer learned that among the major life events, the most profitable to its bottom line was 
pregnancy. Therefore, the retailer offered specific coupons and incentives for its pregnant 
shoppers, keeping in mind that some items would be in higher demand depending upon the 
individuals [Dietrich, 2015]. Most companies and corporations rely on data analytics to compete 
with each other. In addition to major contributions in industry and medicine, the application of 
data analytics can benefit many other facets of science and engineering, including cyber security. 
With attacks such as intrusion, advanced persistent threats, malware, and phishing plaguing 
cyberspace, there is no clear method to discern normal users from malicious actors. However, 
these attacks follow certain procedures that can be categorized. Utilizing data analytics is an 
attempt to generalize such behaviors of suspicious activity in order to promote informed and 
efficient decision-making, otherwise known as cyber threat intelligence.  
 In many papers pertaining to Topological Data Analysis (TDA), one of the common 
motivating factors for pursuing this method of analysis has been the increasing size and 
complexity of data. Improvements and optimizations in modern computing have allowed for the 
collection of massive amounts of data and its storage; such data could possibly reside in high (or 
infinite) dimensional spaces. Some examples include medical information from patients, gene 
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expressions from DNA, preferences/keywords from a search engine, and even data collected 
from a computer network. Additionally, several industries have taken the lead to exploit the data. 
Credit card companies collect transaction information to identify fraudulent purchases, and social 
media sites have become major data sources for both industry and academia [Dietrich, 2015]. 
The terminology used to describe data of this magnitude is unsurprisingly “Big Data”. 
Traditionally, analysts interpret data visually by charting or graphing data in two or even three 
dimensions to find trends or patterns; the shape of the data is significant to observe during data 
analysis. The problem that topological data analysis strives to solve is to provide generalizations 
and conclusions based on the shape of the data. 
 This paper begins with an overview of cyber threat intelligence and existing cyber 
threats. Next, the Problem chapter presents the obstacles in developing predictive analytics for 
cyber intrusions, while also posing Topological Data Analysis (TDA) as a possible solution to 
these challenges. Mathematics behind TDA and Overview of TDA chapters focus on introducing 
TDA, the Mapper method, and the mathematical concepts that support them. Additionally, a 
section in the Overview of TDA chapter also described the provided cyber data for analysis. 
Finally, the Methodology chapter outlines developing an application for automating an open-
source implementation of Mapper and applying the Mapper method to the cyber data. Results 
after applying Mapper can be found in the Results chapter. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Tactical Cyber Threat Intelligence 
 The goal of cyber threat intelligence is to understand existing cyber threats, to share 
information with the responsible parties, and to enable organizations in proactively defending 
against future attacks. There exist three levels of cyber intelligence including Strategic, 
Operational, and Tactical Cyber Intelligence. Since the research and effort of this paper pertains 
to developing indicators of adversarial behavior, this paper focuses on cyber threat intelligence at 
the tactical level. Tactical Cyber Intelligence (TCI) has the purpose of monitoring network 
activity, examining and assessing the strengths and vulnerabilities of an organization’s network 
defenses, and ascertaining patterns and techniques employed by adversaries. At this level, cyber 
threat intelligence positions the organization to progress towards a proactive cyber security 
posture that is both reactive and predictive in nature [INSA, 2015]. To reach this point, TCI 
provides context and relevance to terabytes of data and transform the data into actionable 
intelligence. Action intelligence, to be precise, “refers to information that has been integrated, 
processed, and analyzed from various sources so that customers can use it to meet their threat 
information needs” [INSA, 2015]. In doing so allows an organization to mitigate its enterprise 
risk, to gather threat information following a cyber intrusion in the form of indicators of 
compromise (IOC), and to better equip its cyber defenses against all adversaries. 
To defend against the increase in cyber-attacks and threats, several governments and private 
companies have developed cyber threat intelligence centers and updated cyber security measures. 
Each center is responsible for the research and mitigation of cyber threats, and the sharing of 
intelligence and collaboration between government-specific organizations [Dalziel, 2015]. A few 
examples of government-led cyber threat intelligence centers include the Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) for the U.S., Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), 
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and the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). Other 
organizations involved in cyber threat intelligence collection and haring include the National 
Security Agency, the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, the NSA/CSS Threat 
Operations Center and a wide array of other agencies. In keeping with the theme of cyber threat 
intelligence at the tactical level, the Cyber Intelligence Lifecycle section introduces the general 
process of developing actionable intelligence from the collection and analysis of raw data. 
Moving onto existing cyber threats, the next section introduces the cyber threat environment, a 
classification of the different, recorded cyber threats. Finally, to complete the discussion on 
cyber threat intelligence, the focus changes to Advanced Persistent Threats, a fast-growing cyber 
security concern.  
2.2 Cyber Intelligence Lifecycle 
The Cyber Intelligence Lifecycle outlines the necessary steps for the collection and 
collaboration of cyber threat intelligence. As a component of TCI, there are seven steps in the 
lifecycle that include specifying requirements, collection, process and exploitation, analysis and 
production, dissemination, consumption, and feedback [INSA, 2015]. The first step in the life 
cycle is identifying the information and data to collect based on designated requirements and 
formulate a plan to acquire this information. For instance, an organization seeks to ensure that its 
supply chain is secure, so its cyber intelligence team must gather information about its suppliers 
such as history of transactions or past cyber threat incidences. In collection, this step entails 
selecting relevant sources for information retrieval such as news feeds, whitepapers, technical 
reports, or cyber threat intelligence sharing venues; in the supply chain example, a possible data 
source could be customer reviews or consumer ratings. Next, the processing and exploitation 
stage suggests extracting insights and trends from the data to create a broader intelligence 
product for cyber threat intelligence and decision-making. Doing so requires “an analytic process 
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that is repeatable, easy to implement, and produce valuable information” [INSA, 2015]. The next 
step in the cyber intelligence lifecycle involves packaging and delivering any actionable 
intelligence or assessments produced in the previous stage to sponsors, management, or other 
relevant parties during analysis and production step. Examples of cyber intelligence products 
could include newly discovered vulnerabilities, cyber threat indicators, or general technical 
insights. During the dissemination step, the recipients of the information have analysts and senior 
executives review the actionable intelligence; understanding the findings from the analysis step 
would be essential for determining what actions to be taken afterwards. If the sponsor receiving 
this intelligence discovers that one of its suppliers does promote a good security posture, the 
sponsor may halt all transactions with this supplier. Consumption of information involves 
assessing how it affects the business and mission objects. Finally, the feedback phase of this 
lifecycle is very important for determining if the intelligence products met the customer’s 
needs/requirements and allowing cyber intelligence operators to improve methodologies for 
future intelligence collection.  
2.3 Cyber Threat Environment 
 Before describing the taxonomy of cyber threats, consider all the terms used to discuss 
cyber threats such as cyber adversaries, cyber-attacks, disruptions, and cyber security incidents. 
Formally, a cyber adversary is an individual or organization that carries out cyber-attacks, cyber-
crime, or cyber espionage. Examples of cyber adversaries can vary from foreign state-sponsored 
adversaries, organized criminals, or issue-motivated groups seeking attention to their causes. 
Cyber-attacks, building off of cyber adversaries, are “deliberate acts through cyber space to 
manipulate, destruct, deny, degrade, or destroy computers or networks in order to compromise 
national security, stability or prosperity” [ACSC, 2016]. The Stuxnet program and the incidents 
with the film The Interview would be examples of cyber-attacks; although cyber-attacks can be 
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impactful and damaging economically, cyber adversaries also conduct malicious activity that act 
as simply nuisances, hindering a system or organization but with minimal damage. Such activity, 
known as disruption of services or networks, includes denial of service, web defacement, and 
electronic graffiti. Hacktivists and issue-motivated groups utilize these methods to attract 
attention to themselves and their cause by disrupting social events, business dealings, and 
government activities; these adversaries usually take advantage of the vulnerabilities or poor 
security within a system in order to carry out their aims. Staying with this idea of compromises 
to a security system, a cyber security incident is “any activity that may threaten the security of a 
system or its information whereas a compromise is an incident where a system or its information 
was successfully harmed”; an example would be the extraction of information from a computer 
network [ACSC, 2016]. After understanding these terms, the next topic to discuss would be the 
taxonomy of cyber threats executed by these cyber adversaries.  
 At the top of the threat taxonomy, according to an ENISA threat report for 2015, the first 
cyber threat to discuss is malicious software or malware. Malware provides unauthorized access 
to a system, allowing adversaries to harm or disrupt the system depending on their goals [ACSC, 
2016]. The results are usually heavy costs and damages, affecting a single user in the best case or 
an entire country in the worst case. Cyber threats involving malware have been the most 
predominant cyber threat for the past two years according to both ACSC and ENISA. There is a 
program based in Australia called the Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) that provides 
daily notifications to its participants that alert them of IP addresses on their networks that are 
potentially vulnerable to or infected by malware [ACSC, 2016]. Between October 2014 and 
January 2015, the program has reported over 15,000 malware compromises daily to Australian 
Internet Service Providers. Aside from Australia, other malware incidents occur around the 
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world. The top five countries where malware has infected IT resources include Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Georgia whereas the United States, Russia, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France are the top five countries hosting online malware resources [Marinos, 
2016]. Although malware has become a major cyber threat, the amount of malware appearing 
around the world is still increasing. According the ENISA 2015 Threat Report, malware 
continues to “increase by approximately one million samples every day and, by the publication 
of this report, this overall amount of malware would reach the 2 billion threshold”. Techniques 
for infecting through malware are only becoming more sophisticated; the use of malware is even 
migrating to mobile devices such as Android and iOS. One such delivery mechanism is through 
web-based attacks. 
 Web based attacks utilize the web as a medium to first detect exploits and then install its 
payload. Some examples of web-based attacks range from malicious URLs or compromised 
webpages to browser exploits. Malicious URLs refer to URLs that have been compromised, 
allowing cyber adversaries to leave malware on the site or redirect end-users to download 
malware onto their devices. This tactic in combination with social media and phishing tactics has 
become an alternative to sending malicious programs by e-mail. In fact, Kaspersky Lab’s web 
antivirus identified malicious URLs as the most active malicious object involved in online 
attacks, composing 37% of all attacks [Marinos, 2016]. A compromised webpage attack, also 
known as watering-hole attacks, is baited traps that target frequent visitors of the webpage. In 
2014, the Computer Emergency Response Team in Australia handled 8,100 cases involving 
compromised websites [ACSC, 2016]. Although there are many other cyber threats in cyber 
space, the final types of cyber threats that this paper will focus upon involve an adversary 
gaining access to confidential information. 
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 Continuing with the cyber threat taxonomy, cyber intrusions, cyber espionage, and data 
breaches all consist of similar end goals involving intelligence collection. However, there are 
slight distinctions between the terms. A cyber intrusion is an unauthorized access to a computer 
or system, leading to installation of malware, physical damage, or a data breach. Data 
breaches/data losses, a result of cyber intrusions, is the compromise of significant information 
such as trade secrets, business dealings, intellectual property, or any other data under the 
protection of an organization. Identity information, financial credentials, confidential data or 
intellectual property, and user credentials compose 90% of the types of stolen information; the 
loss of said information mainly affecting government, health, and technology sectors [Marinos, 
2016]. The U.S. Office of Personal management data breach provides a fitting example of how 
cyber threat actors affected government; in this incident, cyber adversaries gained access to the 
personal information of several personnel applying for security clearances. Cyber espionage 
entails collecting information/data from a victim’s computer network; however, the distinction 
from data breaches and cyber intrusions is that cyber espionage can be state-sponsored or 
motivated by industrial competition. There exists a broad range of other threat actors that may 
carry out cyber intrusions and data breaches such as lone cyber criminals, criminal organizations, 
and hacktivism groups. In contrast, state-sponsored threat agents have composed 87% of the 
cyber espionage incidents according the ENISA 2015 Threat Report. Some reported cases 
include the Sony and TV5Monde attacks, and the Bundestag hack. For most of these incidents, 
especially in the case of the Sony attack, adversaries were able to maintain a stable presence 
within the victim’s system for a period of time and remain undetected while stealing confidential 
data. This pattern is characteristic of a growing security concern often referred to as an Advanced 
Persistent Threat. 
P a g e  | 21 
 
2.4 Advanced Persistent Threats 
 Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a growing security concern for many agencies/ 
organizations; they are sophisticated, multistage cyber-attacks with the goal of stealing 
confidential information. In general, threat actors typically target government or military 
agencies as well as businesses. As a result of the intended targets and the level of sophistication 
supporting the attacks, many cyber security researchers attribute them to nation-states. 
Regardless of adversary, the sophistication of the attack lies in an APT’s attack stages in its 
lifecycle. These stages include choosing a victim, reconnaissance, delivery, exploitation, 
operation, data collection and exfiltration [Bere, 2015]. The first and second stages involve 
selecting a target and searching for an entry point into a system (usually an unsuspecting 
employee). Delivery is the stage in the attack where an APT can utilize several methods of 
penetration to gain access into the system; examples of methods include spear-phishing e-mails, 
memory-based attacks, and web-based click jacking. After entering the target’s network, 
exploitation is the stage where an APT executes its payload, exploiting vulnerabilities identified 
in reconnaissance and establishing a secure connection with the system. Once established, an 
APT reaches the operation stage where it can persistently remain within the system possibly over 
a long period of time. The threat searches for sensitive information, traversing through the 
system and collecting data along the way during this stage. Finally, in the data exfiltration stage, 
an APT gathers the acquired data, encrypts it, and sends the packaged data over an encrypted 
channel to multiple servers controlled by the adversary [Bere, 2015]. An APT can repeat any part 
of the lifecycle over again and can reside within the system undetected, leaving the victim 
system at its mercy. There are two real-life APTs known as APT1 and APT29 that illustrate how 
effectiveness of an APT in cyber espionage. 
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Figure 1: Industries Compromised by APT1 [Fireeye, 2013]  
 The first APT to discuss, codenamed APT1, has been one of the most persistent of 
China’s cyber threat actors, carrying out an extensive cyber espionage campaign possibly with 
government-support. Officials at Mandiant, a FireEye company that helps organizations bolster 
their cyber defenses or detect cyber intrusions, wrote an intelligence report outlining the details 
of APT1. Although known for its long-running campaign, according to Mandiant officials, APT1 
was a single organization of operators whose engagement in cyber espionage also led to the 
acquisition of large volumes of information. Since 2006, Mandiant has observed APT1 
compromise “141 companies spanning 20 major industries; of these victims, 87% of them were 
headquartered in countries where English is the native language” [Fireeye, 2013]. Observing the 
industries targeted by APT1, the five highly-valued targets included information technology, 
aerospace, public administration, satellite and telecommunications, and scientific research and 
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consulting. The choice in targets was not the distinguishing aspect of APT1, but the amount of 
time APT1 had access to those systems. Generally, APT1 maintained its connection with the 
victim’s network for an average of 356 days, whereas the longest time APT1 maintained access 
was four years and ten months [Fireeye, 2013]. Once APT1 infiltrated a network, the idea was to 
periodically revisit the victim’s system over a period of weeks or years to avoid attracting 
attention when stealing confidential data; this stolen intellectual property ranged from blueprints 
and source code to business plans and contact information. Mandiant officials have observed 
APT1 stealing “6.5 terabytes of information from a single organization over a time period of ten 
months” [Fireeye, 2013]. Given that APT1 was able to steal this volume of data from a single 
organization and APT1 has compromised at least 141 companies, there is a likely possibility that 
this threat group has stolen hundreds of terabytes of information.  
 The next group is known in cyber threat literature as APT29, a Russian Cyber Threat 
group. Detected in early 2015, stealthy malware titled HAMMERTOSS was responsible for 
relaying commands and extracting data from compromised networks for APT29, using cloud 
storage services and Twitter as places to hide and store the data. This tool had the ability to 
retrieve commands via Twitter and GitHub, to automatically visit different Twitter handles on a 
daily basis, to communicate within specific time periods, to obtain commands via images 
containing encrypted data. This tool could also extract information and upload the data to a cloud 
[Fireeye, 2015]. To summarize the procedure, there were five stages of operation beginning from 
finding a Twitter handle to uploading stolen data. Using an algorithm, HAMMERTOSS 
generates and searches for a Twitter handle; an example handle for the day could be 
“123Bob123”. If the handle is registered, the malware visits the Twitter page with that handle; 
otherwise, it waits another day and checks a different Twitter handle. The next stage involves 
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searching for a tweet with a URL and hashtag on the Twitter page that could possibly represent a 
location and file size. After this stage, the malware follows the URL to an image. This image 
uses steganography, the art of concealing a message in an image or document, to hide encrypted 
data. In the final stage, HAMMERTOSS decrypts the instructions from the image and executes 
them. Since the malware abilities range from reconnaissance to the transfer of data to a cloud 
storage service, these instructions may include any combination of the capabilities described 
previously [Fireeye, 2015]. APT29 was a capable cyber threat group and its effective tool only 
illustrates their ability to carry out cyber espionage campaigns while covering up any evidence of 
their presence.   
3 The Problem 
With the ever-present threat of adversaries compromising a U.S. government cyber 
system or network, there exist many countermeasures and means of protection such as firewalls, 
anti-virus software, and intrusion detection systems. However, such methods rely upon various 
indicators to assist in distinguishing malware and intrusions from normal user activity. To use an 
analogy, security personnel at a research facility can only allow trusted personnel to enter the 
building, but doing so without a list of employees and ID cards is nearly impossible; consider the 
identification and list of employees as proof of trusted personnel whereas individuals without 
these items to be intruders. Of course, creating finitely many rules that would always identify 
malicious activity is challenging, so modern systems continuously update their security based on 
known cyber threat trends. Thus, there is always a need to collect decision quality cyber threat 
intelligence in the form of cyber threat indicators. 
 As described in the section about Cyber Threat Intelligence, there are three levels of 
cyber intelligence. An indicator, precisely, is an inference mechanism based on historical data 
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and past occurrences that can be used to predict future occurrences within a similar setting. 
These indicators in the cyberspace context serve varying purposes at each level. At the Strategic 
level of cyber intelligence, cyber threat indicators include nation-state interest in innovative 
technology to obtain military advantage on a global scale. Operational cyber threat indicators, 
provide the understanding of adversary intent, capability, and likelihood of attack against fielded 
forces. Finally, Tactical cyber threat indicators find trends and patterns in the techniques, tactics, 
and procedures of employed by adversaries in order to predict malicious activity and help 
mission capabilities. Focusing on the tactical level, this problem posed in this paper revolves 
around predictive analytics and producing them through data analysis. 
Residing within the realm of Big Data, cyber data or event log data can be complex and 
highly dimensional consisting of host names, ID numbers, command-line commands, and 
various other fields. This complexity and high-dimensionality introduces a slew of problems in 
addition to traditional roadblocks with large datasets. To identify a few, there are missing values 
within the data, fields that repeat information from other fields, and an inability to visually 
observe the data in a graph or chart. The cyber data discussed in Section 4.5 contains 231 
fields/variables in its original form, but much of the data points were missing information and 
fields like host name and full domain query name represented similar information. Graphing or 
plotting 231-dimensional data in a way that humans can understand is still not possible.  
Aside from complexity, there is also the problem of identifying relationships within the 
data. Principle Component Analysis (PCA), multidimensional scaling (MDS), clustering 
methods are well-known for their applications in data science and machine learning. PCA and 
MDS “attempt to find non-linear maps to Euclidean space which preserve the distance functions 
on the data set”, producing useful two or three dimensional versions of the data if successful 
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[Singh, 2007]. As a result, these methods do handle the complexity problem of the data. 
Concerning clustering methods, they produce distinct, unrelated groupings of the data; 
alternatively, clustering methods creates groups of points that are closer to each other in terms of 
some distance function. The drawback with these methods is these methodologies sometimes 
obscure geometric features. For example, a breast cancer study exploring a new data analysis 
method was able to identify a subgroup of breast cancer tumors that was characterized by high 
survivability in their patients. Researchers in the study tried validating this new subgroup using 
cluster analysis and discovered that clustering overlooked this subgroup of tumors because it had 
scattered points from the subgroups across many clusters [Nicolau, 2011]. One method that 
strives to solve these data complexity problem and sensitivity to large and small scale patterns is 
known as Topological Data Analysis. 
 Topological Data Analysis gives rise to methods that extract and highlight topological 
features in order to summarize the data. The idea is that data possesses shape that may convey 
meaningful information. Data analysts or even curious individuals naturally attempt to look for 
this shape in order to gain insight, but the complexity of the data prevents them from using basic 
methods like graphing in two or three dimensions. With its origins from combinatorics, discrete 
geometry, linear algebra, and topology, TDA methods utilize three invariants studied in topology 
in order to capture the shape of the data [Chintakunta, 2016]. The following section discusses 
these three invariants in detail. In addition, TDA methods derive relationships within the data by 
preserving a notion of nearness but distorting large scale distances; small distances can signify 
similarity whereas large distances possess little meaning [Singh, 2007]. One TDA method 
highlighted within this paper is called Mapper; Mapper essentially reduces high dimensional data 
sets into simplicial complexes or discrete combinatorial objects that globally represents the data. 
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The Python Mapper is an open-source implementation of the Mapper method that is limited in its 
capabilities but provides enough features as described in the method. Although a standalone 
Python application, the Python Mapper does not provide the capability to pull data or to analyze 
the data beyond visualization. This paper proposes designing and implementing a system to 
integrate these features into the Python Mapper as well as applying the Python Mapper to cyber 
data. 
 Along with the completion of this report, there are many criteria for the success of this 
project. One criterion is the completion of a TDA system that pulls information from a cloud 
storage service, cleans and parses the data, applies the Mapper method to the data, and allows for 
further analysis of the Mapper output. Another goal for the project is to develop cyber analytics 
or rules that help existing cyber detection systems to identify malicious activity. Finally, the last 
criterion for success is the continuation of the project with an emphasis of TDA being applied to 
machine learning and the additional research of persistent homology.  
4 Mathematics behind TDA 
 Topology is a branch of mathematics whose origin dates back to the time of Leonhard 
Euler, an 18th century Swiss mathematician well-known for many influential discoveries and 
contributions to mathematics. Topology is the mathematical study of properties unaltered by 
continuous deformations such as stretching or twisting on objects in space. To elaborate further, 
this notion of preservation after some deformation translates to a notion of equivalence. An 
example is the deformation of a donut to a coffee cup; both are topologically equivalent to each 
other. Until the development of topological data analysis, concepts and results produced in 
topology have resided solely in theory and pure mathematics. Thus, before introducing this new 
method of data analysis, the following sections focus on the supporting mathematics. Many of 
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these concepts and definitions can be found in references such as Morris’s Topology without 
Tears, Zomorodin’s Topology for Computing, and from lectures taught by Norman Wildberger 
and T. Dey. 
4.1 Topological Spaces 
 Beginning with some basic definitions, a set is a collection of objects that can be numbers 
or other sets; in this case, the objects are points. A metric computes the distance between two 
points in the set. A space is a set of points and any space with a metric is known as a metric 
space; the most familiar metric space is Euclidean space.  
Definition 4.1.1 A set X with a metric function d is called metric space. The metric or 
distance function d: 𝑋 × 𝑋 → 𝑅 is a function satisfying the following axioms:  
i. For all x, y in X, d (x, y) ≥ 0 
ii. If d (x, y) = 0, then x = y 
iii. For all x, y in X, d (x, y) = d (y, x) 
iv. For all x, y, z in X, d (x, y) + d (y, z) ≥ d (x, z) 
 
In a more general manner, metrics for any topological space reflect the notion of similarity or 
closeness. Since the points in a topological space are distinct and abstract entities, small or large 
distances between two points may signify similarity or dissimilarity, respectively. Coordinate 
invariance, a term defined later on, allows one to study the connectedness of a point set in a more 
general manner than with metric spaces that assigns distances based on coordinates. A 
topological space consists of the point set and a set of all subsets from this point set, but the 
formal definition is as follows: 
Definition 4.1.2 Let X be a non-empty set. A set τ of subsets of X is said to be a topology 
on X if:  
i. X and the empty set belong to τ. 
ii. The union of any (finite or infinite) number of sets in τ belongs to τ. 
iii. The intersection of any two sets in τ belongs to τ. 
 
Definition 4.1.3 The pair (X, τ) is a topological space, where X and τ are defined as 
before.  
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A fundamental question in topology is whether two topological spaces are equivalent. To do so 
requires that any topological properties in one topological space map to the other space. 
Elaborating on mapping, recall first that a function 𝑓: 𝑅 → 𝑅 is said to be continuous if for 𝑎 ∈
𝑅 and each positive real number ε, there exists a positive real number δ such that | 𝑥 − 𝑎| <  𝛿 
implies | 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑎)| <  𝜀. Alternatively, let X and Y be two topological spaces, a function that 
maps X to Y is continuous if the inverse image of an arbitrary open set in Y is open in X [Kraft, 
2016]. These continuous maps between topological spaces preserve key properties of space and 
help exhibit the notion of topological equivalence. One fundamental notion of equivalence in 
topology is a homeomorphism.  
Definition 4.1.4 Let X and Y be two topological spaces. A homeomorphism f: 𝑋 → 𝑌  is 
a bijective function, such that both f and the inverse of f are continuous. We say that X is 
homeomorphic to Y, 𝑋 ≈ 𝑌, and that X and Y are topologically equivalent.  
 
Referring back to the example of the donut (torus) and coffee cup, both objects are topologically 
equivalent, or more formally homeomorphic. One can apply continuous transformations on the 
donut to produce the cup and vice versa. Another more abstract example concerning 
homeomorphism pertains to the interval [0, 1] and the unit circle [Wildberger, 2012]. To 
intuitively show that these spaces are not homeomorphic to each other, imagine removing a point 
from the circle and removing a point from the interval. While the circle remains a singly 
connected component, the interval splits into two components. If the circle and closed interval 
were homeomorphic, they would share the same genus; the genus is the maximum number of 
cuttings on the surface without disconnecting it. Another notion of equivalence studied in 
topology is known as homotopy equivalence. Homotopy preserves some aspects of 
connectedness such as the number of connected components and the number of holes in space. 
Its definition and its requirements for equivalences are as follows: 
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Definition 4.1.5 Let g: 𝑋 → 𝑈 and h: 𝑋 → 𝑈 be maps. A homotopy is a map H: 𝑋 ×
[0,1] → 𝑈 such that H (*, 0) = g and H (*, 1) = h. Two maps are homotopic if there is a 
homotopy connecting them. 
 
Definition 4.1.6 Two topological space T and U are homotopy equivalent if there exists 
maps g: 𝑇 → 𝑈 and h: 𝑈 → 𝑇 such that ℎ°𝑔 is homotopic to the identity map iT: 𝑇 → 𝑇 
and 𝑔°ℎ is homotopic to the identity map iU: 𝑈 → 𝑈 
 
Alternatively, two spaces are considered homotopy equivalent if one space can be continuously 
deformed into the other space. Consider a loop in some space; shrinking the loop eventually 
turns the loop into a single point, so this loop would be homotopy equivalent to a point. These 
concepts of homeomorphisms and homotopic equivalence become involved in the discrete 
constructs and mathematical definitions supporting the Mapper output. In fact, Gurjeet Singh 
noted in his dissertation that these Mapper constructions were similar to Reeb graphs [Singh, 
2007]. The following definitions help describe these constructs.  
Definition 4.1.7 Let X and Z be topological spaces and let f: 𝑋 → 𝑍 be a continuous map. 
Let 𝑈 = {𝑈𝛼}𝛼∈𝐴 be a finite open covering of Z. Consider the cover f
*(U) = 
{𝑓−1(𝑈𝛼 )}𝛼∈𝐴  of X, typically called the pull-back of U along f. The mapper construction 
resulting from the given dataset (X) is known as the nerve complex of the pull-back cover 
𝑀(𝑈, 𝑓) ∶= 𝑁(𝑓∗(𝑈)) [Kim, 2016]. 
 
Definition 4.1.8 Define a covering (projection) as a surjective open map from two 
topological spaces that is locally a homeomorphism. 
 
Definition 4.1.9 Given a finite covering 𝑈 = {𝑈𝛼 }𝛼∈𝐴 of a space X, define the nerve of 
the covering U to be the simplicial complex N(U) whose vertex set is the indexing set A, 
and where a family {a0,a1, . . . ,ak} spans a k-simplex in N(U) if and only if 𝑈𝛼0  ∩
𝑈𝛼1  ∩. . .∩ 𝑈𝛼𝑘 =  ∅ [Singh, 2007]. 
 
To utilize Mapper, the algorithm requires a metric space X (data), a filter function mapping 
X to Z, and a covering for Z as input. The following sections should give an overview of how the 
Mapper is able to summarize the shape of the data with a high degree of accuracy given these 
inputs.  
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4.2 Simplicial Complexes 
 To begin this section, suppose there is a set X composed of n points x1, …, xn that belong 
to Rd where d is the dimension for R. An affine combination can be any summation of these 
points in X, written as ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑥𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 , such that the summation of all coefficients 𝜇𝑖 totals to 1. If all 
the coefficients 𝜇𝑖 sum to 1 and each 𝜇𝑖 is nonnegative, then x = ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑥𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1  is referred to as a 
convex combination of the 𝜇𝑖. Consequently, the convex hull is the set of all possible convex 
combination of these coefficients. Keeping these definitions in mind, simplexes are as follows: 
Definition 4.2.1 A k-simplex Ω is the convex hull of a set p of k+1 affinely independent 
points. A k-simplex has dimension k.  
 
Since the points belong to Rn, the k-simplex can be defined in terms of k+1 linearly independent 
points. Recall that a set S is linearly or affinely independent if no point in S is a linear (affine) 
combination of any other point in S. As a result, the two terms for independence are 
interchangeable. Now, some familiar simplexes include a point (0-simplex), a line segment (1-
simplex), a triangle (2-simplex), and a tetrahedron (3-simplex). Before moving onto simplicial 
complexes, given a k-simplex defined by a point set S, know that a face is a simplex defined by a 
nonempty subset of S. 
Definition 4.2.2 A simplicial complex K is a set containing finitely many simplexes that 
satisfy the following two restrictions: 
i. K contains every face of every simplex in K 
ii. For any two simplices σ, τ belonging to K, their intersection is either empty or a 
face of both σ and τ 
 
Simplicial complexes are combinatorial objects that represent spaces, encoding locations of 
points relative to nearby points and representing the connectedness of the space. These aspects 
are helpful in representing high-dimensional objects or highlighting specific topological 
properties in surfaces. To do so requires creating triangulations of the surface or high-
dimensional object. 
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Definition 4.2.3 A triangulation of topological space X is a simplicial complex K 
together with a homeomorphism between X and |K|, where |K| is the underlying space of 
K and |K| = ∪𝜎𝜖𝐾 𝜎. Note that |K| is itself a topological space. 
 
Take, for example, the surface of a sphere; the surface of a tetrahedron or 3-simplex is a 
triangulation of a sphere because they share similar properties like number of connected 
components and number of voids. Representing a sphere with a tetrahedron requires less 
resources and memory for a computer to process and display. This idea of constructing 
triangulations is evident in the Mapper method discussed in Section 5.2. With Mapper, 
triangulations create topological summaries of the complex data.  
4.3 Simplicial Homology and Betti Numbers 
Simplicial complexes can approximate all topological spaces. Building upon this concept, 
simplicial homology utilizes finitely generated Abelian groups to measure the number of n-
dimensional holes in a topological space. Algebraic topology is a branch of topology that 
provides simplicial homology the ability to construct algebraic tools called homology groups to 
quantify topological features in simplicial complexes [Dey, 2013]. Before formally defining 
homology groups for simplicial complexes, the following definitions introduce chains and 
boundaries. Consider a set X and a simplicial complex K on X. A p-chain c for K is a formal sum 
of p-simplices added with coefficients, that is, c = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  where 𝜎𝑖 are the p-simplices and 𝛼𝑖 
are the coefficients. P-chains can form a group under addition. 
Definition 4.3.1 The k th chain group of a simplicial complex K is 〈𝐶𝑘(𝐾),+〉, the free 
Abelian group on the oriented k-simplices, where the identity is the chain 0 = ∑ 0𝜎𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  
and the inverse of a chain c is c itself since c + c = 0. 
 
Figure 3 will help illustrate concepts for previous and consequent definitions. In this oriented 
graph, the 0-simplices (vertices) are X, Y, and Z; the 1-simplices (edges) are a, b, c, and d. The 
closed walk [abc] starting from X can be written as an addition of edges such as a + b + c. Since 
commutativity applies to this naming scheme, a + b + c is the same as b + c + a and c + a + b. In 
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this case, note that the closed walk a + b + c = (a + b + d) + (c - d) where (a + b + d) and (c - d) 
are the two smaller closed walks in the graph. Chain groups for this graph include C0 (the free 
abelian group on vertices in G) and C1 (free abelian group on directed edges). C0 contain 0-
dimensional chains that are integral linear combinations of the vertices (e.g. x – 6y + 8z). C1 
consists of 1-dimensional chains that are integral linear combinations of directed edges such as 
4a – 5b + 3c + 4d. 
 
 
Figure 2: Graph G Illustrating Chain groups [Wildberger, 2012] 
 
With the chain group defined as 𝐶𝑘(𝐾), choose an ordering on X and define the following 
sequence of homomorphism: 
 
Figure 3: Sequence of homomorphisms [Dey, 2013] 
Definition 4.3.2 If σ = [v0, …, vp] is a p-simplex, its boundary is 𝛿𝑝𝜎 =
∑ {𝑣0, … ,   𝑣?̂? ,…  ,𝑣𝑝}
𝑝
𝑖=0  where  𝑣?̂? indicates that the vertex  𝑣𝑖 omitted.  
 
The boundary operator, denoted 𝛿𝑝, defines a mapping between chain groups found in different 
dimensions. Specifically, given a p-simplex, the boundary operator returns the (p-1)-chain of its 
boundary (p-1)-simplices. An example would be that, given a tetrahedron, the boundary operator 
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would return the four triangle faces of the tetrahedron. For the figure above, the boundary 
operator describes the relationship between edges and vertices; the boundary of a directed edge 
in Graph G is written destination vertex – starting vertex. The boundary of directed edge a is y – 
x and the boundary of edge b is z - y, or alternatively 𝛿 (𝑎) = 𝑦 − 𝑥 and 𝛿(𝑏) = 𝑧 − 𝑦. In 
addition to boundaries and chains, a p-cycle c is a p-chain such that 𝛿𝑐 = 0. To see that the 
boundary operator returns 0 for cycles/loops, applying the operator boundary to a + b + c for the 
graph in Figure 2 results in 𝛿 (𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐) =  𝛿 (𝑎) +  𝛿 (𝑏) +  𝛿 (𝑐) = 0 . Similar to chains and 
chain groups, p-cycles can form a p-cycle group. 
Definition 4.3.3 The k th cycle group is Zk = Kernel (δk). A chain that is an element of Zk 
is a k-cycle. The kth boundary group is Bk = Image (δk+1). A chain that is an element of 
Bk is a k-boundary. 
 
Define the Kernel of the boundary operator to be the elements of the kth cycle group that map to 
the identity element in the (k-1)th cycle group. Additionally, define the Image (δk+1) to be set of 
all elements in the (k-1)th cycle group that elements in kth cycle group can map to under the 
boundary operation. From here, a formal definition of a homology group follows from the 
previous definitions. 
 
Definition 4.3.4 The k th homology group is the quotient Kernel (δk) / Image (δk+1), 
denoted Hk = Zk / Bk. 
 
Related to homology groups, Betti numbers measure the number of connected components, 
cycle, voids, and their higher dimensional analogues [Kraft, 2016]. They essentially summarize 
homology groups by encapsulating properties of topological spaces as numerical values; in 
particular, Betti numbers refer to the number of n-dimensional holes on a topological surface or 
simplicial complex. More formally, the definition of a Betti number is as follows: 
P a g e  | 35 
 
Definition 4.3.5 The k th Betti number, denoted βk, of a simplicial complex K is β(Hk), the 
rank of the free part of Hk. βk = rank (Hk) = rank (Zk) – rank (Bk) where Zk and Bk have 
been defined previously. 
 
The next section builds upon all the definitions discussed thus far and introduces a method for 
finding features in a topological space called persistent homology.  
4.4 Persistent Homology 
Creating triangulations of point cloud can summarize any topological features showcased 
in the data, but another approach known as Persistent homology goes a step further. The key idea 
in Persistent Homology is discovering the extent in which persistent (actual) topological features 
remain after introducing noise to the data. Observe in Figure 4 that the data set is a curve in R2 
with two loops. First, consider a noisy point cloud sampled from the curve; sampling points 
means selecting points with a probability distribution concentrated near the shape of the curve 
[Carlsson, 2009]. Let P denote the set of sampled data points. As illustrated in the figure below, 
the approach entails creating a complex from the union of balls of size ε > 0 around each data 
point in P, calculating the homology of the resulting construct, and observing which features 
persist while modifying ε. Figure 4 shows that increasing the radii (ε) of the balls centered on 
each data point eventually creates the two loops. When the size of ε is large enough, the two 
loops disappear in Figure 4D. These two loops must be significant topological features because 
they were able to persist longer than any other feature that might have existed. In summary, this 
example exhibits how persistent homology gives an overview of the homological information for 
all the different values of ε. 
From point cloud to complex, the process is essentially using the data points from the point 
cloud as vertices to output a combinatorial graph whose edges are based on proximity of data 
points. Modeling a point cloud data X by a simplicial complex serves to assist in computing its 
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topological invariants. In computational topology, there are various ways to convert X into a 
complex; the following definitions describe two such methods.  
Definition 4.3.6 Let ε > 0 be a real number. Define the Vietoris-Rips Complex, denoted 
𝑉(𝑋, 𝜀), to be a simplicial complex on the set X consisting of these subsets 𝜎 ⊂ 𝑋 where 
d (x, y) < ε for any x and y in 𝜎. Note that for 𝜀 ≤ 𝜀′ for some nonnegative real number 
𝜀′, 𝑉(𝑋, 𝜀)  ⊂  𝑉(𝑋, 𝜀′). 
Definition 4.3.7 Let ε > 0 be a real number. Define the Cech Complex, denoted 𝐶(𝑋, 𝜀), 
to be a simplicial complex on the set X consisting of these subsets 𝜎 ⊂ 𝑋 for which there 
is a 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 such that 𝑑 (𝑥, 𝑦) <  𝜀 for any 𝑥 ∈ 𝜎. Note that for 𝜀 ≤ 𝜀′ for some 
nonnegative real number 𝜀′, 𝐶(𝑋, 𝜀)  ⊂  𝐶(𝑋, 𝜀′). 
 
Using either method to construct complexes from a point cloud, the result is a nested sequence of 
complexes that record the changes in homology as ε increases. This nested sequence is known as 
a filtration. 
Definition 4.3.8 Given a simplicial complex K, a filtration is a nested subsequence of 
complexes Ki of K, indexed by the nonnegative integers, such that if i ≤ j then 𝐾𝑖 ⊆ 𝐾𝑗. 
The total ordering itself is called a filter. 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Persistent Homology [Dey, 2013] 
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Definition 4.3 In relation to persistence, the p-th persistent homology groups are the 
Images of homomorphism, 𝐻𝑝
𝑖𝑗 = 𝑖𝑚 𝑓𝑝
𝑖𝑗 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛.  
 
Given a filtration, the i-th complex Ki has associated boundary operators 𝛿𝑘
𝑖  and groups such as 
𝐶𝑘
𝑖 ,  𝐵𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑍𝑘
𝑖 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑘
𝑖  for all 𝑖, 𝑘 ≥ 0. Note that the p-th persistent homology groups describe when 
a class is born and when it dies.  
Definition 4.3 (Birth and Death) Consider a simplicial complex 𝐾 and a function 𝑓: 𝐾 →
𝑅 on it (note 𝑓−1on some interval between −∞ and 𝑎 ∈ 𝑅 gives a filtration on K). A p-th 
homology class [c] is born at a simplicial complex 𝐾𝑖 if  [𝑐] ∈ 𝐻𝑝(𝐾𝑖), but [𝑐] ∉
 𝐻𝑝(𝐾𝑖−1). The p-th homology class dies entering 𝐾𝑗 if it merges with a class that is born 
earlier. Formally, 𝑓 𝑖,𝑗−1([𝑐]) ∉  𝐻𝑝
𝑖−1,𝑗−1 , but 𝑓 𝑖,𝑗 ([𝑐]) ∈  𝐻𝑝
𝑖−1,𝑗. 
 
Persistent diagrams are visual representations of the persistent homology that exhibit the 
evolution of topological features within the filtration. They are defined as “extended planes 
(ℝ ⋃{±∞ })2 on which a point with two coordinates represents a birth paired with a death” [Dey, 
2013]. In other words, the first coordinate corresponds to the starting index when the feature was 
created and the second point represents when it dies (persistence). Key invariants in persistence 
diagrams called barcodes “measure the significance of a feature based on its lifespan through a 
filtration” [Kraft, 2016]. The bars in a barcode record when a feature lives or dies at some 
particular value for ε; longer bars mean that a feature within a complex is persistent and gives 
meaning to statistical significance for a component of the complex such as a loop or void. On the 
other hand, smaller bars correspond to either noise within the data or noise introduced through 
sampling.  
Gunnar Carlsson’s Topology and Data, The Basic Theory of Persistent Homology by K. 
Wang, and lecture notes written by Tamal Dey provide a rigorous explanation of persistent 
homology using an algebraic construction. In terms of application of persistent homology, Fintan 
Hegarty’s doctoral dissertation, Computation Homology of Cubical and Permutahedral 
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Complexes, outlines various applications in topology estimation (finding topological features 
from a sampling of the original data set), image segmentation (changing an image’s 
representation for feature recognition), and in medicine [Hegarty, 2012]. The next chapter 
discusses research and advances in topological data analysis, focusing especially on Mapper and 
a company called Ayasdi that combined machine learning with an improved version of Mapper.  
5. Overview of TDA 
In terms of major difficulties with data, there are many challenges involved with Big 
Data. Advances in data management have allowed professionals to tackle the sheer volume of 
information associated with Big Data. However, the other major problem that this paper focuses 
upon is the high dimensionality and complexity of data. With the introduction of topological data 
analysis (TDA), research has leaned towards capturing the underlying shape of the data to 
uncover any meaningful phenomena hidden within the data. To be more precise, a given dataset 
creates a point cloud of data in possibly high dimension; within topology, the resulting shape 
refers to the features within the data that do not change under continuous deformations like 
shrinking or stretching [Chintakunta, 2016].  
Before discussing topological data analysis in general, the first section describes three 
invariants in topology that enable methods in topological data analysis to accurately and robustly 
obtain shapes of data. Software packages, such as the Python Mapper or JavaPlex, have taken 
advantage of these properties to create visualizations of high dimensional data. Utilizing the 
available TDA software, there have been several applications within medical research as well as 
in the social sciences; concerning medical research, TDA has assisted in identifying subgroups 
within breast cancer patients and diabetes patients. This application along with other examples 
appear in Section 5.4. Building upon these foundations, persistent homology and barcodes of 
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data have led to further advances in TDA as well as more robust algorithms for pattern 
recognition. Many publications like Robert Ghrist’s Barcodes and Gunnar Carlsson’s Topology 
and Data have a focus on persistent homology and its applications. 
5.1 Topological Invariants 
Stemming from ideas and concepts since the time of Leonhard Euler, topology has been 
an abstract field of mathematics that has solely been used to study abstractly defined shapes and 
surfaces [Lum, 2013]. With the introduction of topological data analysis, data scientists and 
researchers saw the potential of adapting topological concepts to large and complex data sets. 
The reason for its success with high dimensional data sets is due to three topological properties 
known as coordinate invariance, deformation invariance, and compressed representation. These 
properties give topology its ability to study shape in a robust manner. Coordinate invariance 
refers to how topological objects are independent of any specific representation in a coordinate 
system. Instead, the pairwise distances between points of the object are significant [Carlsson, 
2014]. In other words, these properties of shape remain unaltered after rotating the object or 
changing the coordinate system of the object, allowing for comparisons between objects residing 
in different dimensions. Deformation invariance refers to how topological properties of shape 
also remain unchanged if one stretches or shrinks the object in question without any tearing or 
gluing. For example, consider any letter of the English alphabet; most people can recognize this 
letter even in a different font or size. In topology, an ellipse and a circle in the 2-dimensional 
plane are topologically equivalent because they share similar characteristics like number of 
holes/loops. Finally, compressed representation refers to building simpler representations of 
shapes, capturing the topological features of the shape and losing the finer details [Carlsson, 
2014]. Considering a circle as an example, one topological feature defining the shape of a circle 
is its loop. Thus, a hexagon with the similar shape and loop can represent a circle; this 
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representation is more preferable compared to the infinite number of points in a circle because a 
hexagon consists of only six nodes and six edges [Lum, 2013]. The curvature of the circle is lost 
in the compression, but the representation preserves the major topological feature of a loop. 
Applications of topological data analysis have been wide-reaching, ranging from applications in 
medicine to business data analytics. However, in this paper, the case studies utilizing topological 
data analysis are going to focus on one method known as Mapper and its implementation called 
Python Mapper. 
5.2 Mapper 
 First introduced by Gurjeet Singh, Gunnar Carlsson, and Facundo Memoli, the Mapper 
algorithm is a method for topological data analysis, emphasizing the goal of giving shape to data 
and interpreting this shape [Singh, 2007]. Complex data can incorporate several attributes or 
features; for example, patient medical data consists of age, gender, blood pressure, etc. Singh 
states in a paper dedicated to introducing this method, “this new method for qualitative analysis, 
simplification, and visualization of high dimensional sets possesses the ability to reduce high 
dimensional data into simplicial complexes in order to capture topological and geometric 
features at a specified resolution” [Singh, 2007]. This method builds a compressed representation 
of data to highlight its significant features. The Mapper algorithm achieves this result by using 
topological ideas that preserve closeness or similarity but alter distances of large magnitude. This 
property fits into data analysis of high throughput biological data especially well, as noted in the 
application of Mapper sections.  
 Moving to the algorithm itself, it consists of multiple steps involving a distance/similarity 
metric, a filter function, a clustering algorithm, and the output visualization. Section 5.2.2 
provides an explanation of metrics and the criteria used for selecting one. Three assumptions of 
the algorithm are: only numerical values compose the given data set X, the user has chosen an 
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appropriate distance or similarity metric, and “computation of inter-point distance between 
points or even sets of points from the data is possible” [Singh, 2007].  
If the data set contains non-numeric strings, the user must transform these attributes in 
the data to numeric data by either encoding the information or dropping them from the data 
altogether. A filter function f: X → R refers to a real-valued function that maps data points in X 
to the real number line. Selecting this filter function is as significant as choosing a distance 
metric because this function determines the topological features to highlight; the user may select 
or integrate functions that reflect certain properties of the data. Keeping these instructions and 
advice in mind, the first step in the algorithm is finding the range of function restricted to the 
data points. The accompanying step is partitioning this range into smaller, overlapping intervals 
in order to create a covering space of the data points. Percentage of overlap and number of 
interval are both parameters that the user can tune or change. To illustrate this step, consider a 
closed interval [0, 2] partitioned into 3 smaller intervals with 50% overlap; the resulting intervals 
are [0, 1], [0.5, 1.5], [1, 2]. Now, within each interval, the algorithm forms sets of data points 
such that from the data set such that the function value of the data point lies within that interval 
and clusters the points based on distance [Singh, 2007]. More formally, the algorithm forms sets 
Xj = { 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 | 𝑓𝑗 (𝑥) ∈ 𝐼𝑗} where j is an index into the set of intervals I. Although good 
clustering is also important to consider when visualizing the data, this algorithm does not place 
any restrictions on the clustering algorithm involved, so it promotes the use of user-defined and 
domain specific clustering algorithms. The authors introducing the Mapper algorithm have based 
their clustering algorithm on single-linkage clustering; this algorithm “returns a vector in 𝑅𝑁−1 
that holds the length of an added edge to reduce the number of clusters by one at each step of the 
algorithm” [Singh, 2007]. Once clustering is complete, the algorithm outputs a representative 
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simplicial complex of the data; the Python Mapper goes further to display this representation as a 
2-dimensional network of nodes. All edges between nodes/clusters in the graph indicate that their 
intersection is non-empty. This visualization additional has a coloring and labeling of each node; 
colors represent the average function value of the node and labels indicate the number of data 
points residing within a node. 
5.2.1 Python Mapper 
 The Python Mapper is an implementation of the Mapper algorithm written with Python 
and C++ bindings [Mullner, 2013]. In addition to implementing the algorithm, the software also 
consists of a graphical user interface that enables beginners to quickly acquaint themselves with 
its many features such as filter selection and node coloring options. Developers of the toolchain, 
David Mullner and Aravindakshan Babu, have provided this complete and extensible toolchain 
to the scientific community as open-source software in hopes of other researchers “extending, 
modifying, and applying the software for new ideas” [Mullner, 2013]. As of 2016, there have 
been numerous uses of Python Mapper on breast cancer patient data as well as employee 
information. Before discussing these applications in more detail, this section begins by 
elaborating on the Mapper algorithm further. 
5.2.2 Metrics  
 Since clustering contributes to the algorithm, there must be a measure of distance and/or 
similarity to determine the closeness of any two data points. The formal definition of similarity 
is, “the measure of how close to each other two instance are; the closer two instances are in 
comparison, the larger the similarity value”. In contrast, the dissimilarity measure determines 
how different two instances are. A distance metric is a measure of dissimilarity that obeys the 
conditions outlined in Definition above. 
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Utilizing one of these metrics to determine similarity/dissimilarity requires first that the 
fields within the data align with the criteria of that metric; matching the criteria allows for an 
accurate measure of closeness between two data points. To elaborate on this point, consider that 
attributes within the dataset can vary in type; attributes of the data can be nominal, cardinal, or 
ordinal. Cardinal or numerical data have a continuous scale of values like sale profits, time, or 
height, whereas ordinal data infers an order on the values and nominal or categorical data are 
discrete values. Examples of nominal data include gender, favorite color, and names. Comparing 
two data points composed of only nominal attributes with some real-valued metric like Euclidean 
distance would not provide any information on closeness; one cannot compare two names using 
Euclidean distance. However, the alternative is to use Hamming distance to determine the 
number of different/similar characters present in the two names. The Python Mapper 
implementation provides three distance metrics such as Euclidean, Minkowski, and Chebyshev. 
 Beginning with the Euclidean metric, Euclidean distance is the most well-known 
measurement for distance. Given any two points U, V in a two-dimensional space, the square 
root of summing (Ux - Vx)2 and (Uy – Vy)2 gives the distance between those two points. A 
generalization of this formula to an N-dimensional space is a summation of the squared 
differences between corresponding components of any two N-dimensional vectors. The 
Minkowski distance, on the other hand, is a generalized metric to measure the differences 
between absolute magnitude of differences between a pair of objects. Chebyshev Distance, also 
known as maximum value distance, “measures the absolute magnitude of difference between 
coordinates of a pair of objects” [Tabish, 2009]. The formulas for these metrics can be seen in 
Table 1.  
P a g e  | 44 
 
Table 1: Distance functions 
 
Utilizing the filter function in the next step of the algorithm, these distance metrics allows this 
method to project data points onto R1; selecting the filter function is as important as selecting the 
metric because any interpretations of the output depends upon the choice of filter function. 
5.2.3 Filter Functions 
Crucial steps in the algorithm involve using a function to map data points to values in R1, 
partitioning the range of values restricted to this set of data, and devising a cover for this range. 
One important point to note is that this function relies on the ability to compute distances 
between points; again, the metric determines how this distance is computed. Focusing further on 
the filter function, the purpose of this function is to summarize all the relevant features of the 
input data. The outcome, as a result, becomes heavily dependent upon the filter function’s 
method of mapping the data points [Singh, 2007]. To illustrate this concept, consider the 
geometrical point cloud data and the two filter functions in Figure 5. Filter function f computes 
the height of a point from the input data, whereas filter function g summarizes the input data 
from a horizontal perspective. To understand the output, imagine first a horizontal plane moving 
from the top of the Y-shaped point cloud to the bottom. The intersections between the plane and 
point cloud result in the Y shape to the right of the point cloud. For the filter function g, consider 
a vertical plane that moves horizontally from left to right of the data. Beginning from the left, 
there is one connected component that results in one point of the corresponding loop in the 
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output. Continuing, the intersections become two lines on the plane, resulting in the top and 
bottom curves of the left loop in the output. The intersection between the middle section of point 
cloud and the plane is a connected component that allows the two curves to meet and create one 
loop. Symmetry of the point cloud indicates how the remaining section creates the right loop.  
 
Figure 5: Illustration of Filter Function Representing Input Data [Kim, 2015] 
Figure 6 illustrates the same concept but using an H-shaped point cloud. 
 
Figure 6: Another Example of Filter Functions [Bayless, 2015] 
 Provided in the Python Mapper, there are seven filter functions that represent or highlight 
different properties of the data. The first set of functions aim, “to understand a mathematical 
context surrounding the data points in the space” [Kim, 2015]. These functions, eccentricity and 
Gaussian density, highlight the geometry of the data set. For Gaussian density, the mapper 
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implementation utilizes a kernel density estimator with a multivariate, radially symmetric 
Gaussian kernel. Gaussian density assumes that all values within a data points are Euclidean data 
in order to compute the distribution of the data. Looking at the corresponding formula in Table 2, 
 
Table 2: Available Filter Functions 
epsilon controls the smoothness of the density estimate on the data set. Moving to eccentricity, 
the intuition is that this function determines which points in the data are different from the center 
of the data without designating a center point(s). Understanding how the functions compute 
distances, however, is meaningless if one cannot interpret the shape of the resulting mapper 
output.  
5.2.4 Interpretation of Visualizations 
Each filter function provides different meanings and interpretations of the data, so this 
section gives a brief summary of them. A possible interpretation that may originate from using 
the eccentricity filter function would be that low-valued nodes are closer to the center of the data 
and any high-valued nodes branching from this center infers anomalous behavior. In terms of the 
Gaussian density estimator, the resulting output should infer the distribution of distance values. 
For example, looking at Figure 5, one can infer that the data set is bi-modal; such an inference 
would indicate that the data points near the top of the network in Figure 5 showcase more unique 
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traits than the rest of the data. Although these functions are a subset of the available filters in the 
Python Mapper, this section reinforces the idea that the choice in filter function is essential in 
producing the desired output.  
5.3 Ayasdi 
 Perhaps the most prominent company at the forefront of topological data analysis 
research and application, Ayasdi is an advanced analytics company that has taken Mapper 
beyond simply visualizing data and has created a new product to help their clients solve complex 
data analytics challenges. Ayasdi’s product incorporates “the latest machine learning, statistical 
and geometric algorithms with topological data analysis and big data infrastructure” [Ayasdi, 
2016]. The aspects concerning topological data analysis constructs compressed representations 
of the data, from which data scientists and analysts search for variables that impact the patterns 
found in the representation. This process, consequently, results in features holding predictive 
power that lay the foundation for machine learning algorithms.  
5.4 Applications of Topological Data Analysis 
 In this section, the main topic of discussion is applying the Mapper algorithm to identify 
shape and to solve real problems. The first section describes the algorithm’s ability to capture the 
shape of a hand and other topological objects from sampled points. Afterwards, the second 
section discusses Mapper’s application within medicine and business. One application comes 
from breast cancer study and the other application involves employee information from a 
company.  
5.4.1 Mapper on 3-D Shapes 
 The first application is representing a two-dimensional picture of a human hand; the 
result was representing a data set of a thousand points by a network of 13 nodes and 12 edges 
[Lum, 2013].  Following the steps in the Mapper algorithm, the process begins with sampling 
P a g e  | 48 
 
data points from the image in order to create point cloud data resembling a hand. After 
processing the data with a filter function and partitioning, clustering and network construction 
produces Visualization D in Figure 7. This output captures the overall shape of the hand in size 
and orientation as well as the position and length of the fingers and thumb. Additionally, the 
branches in the network reflect the location in which the fingers and thumbs extend from the 
palm of the hand.  
 
Figure 7: TDA Pipeline [Lum, 2013, Figure 1] 
 For the next few examples, each of the point cloud data resembles a topological object 
such as a circle, torus, and a knot. Beginning with Figure 8, the point cloud consists of a circle of 
data points and several other points that serve as noise. Using the Singular Vale Decomposition 
filter with the Euclidean metric, single-linkage clustering, and a balanced cover, the network to 
the right of the point cloud represents the circle as a loop in the network. The noisy data does not 
interfere in representing the circle; in fact, the algorithm places the noisy points along the path in 
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the network. Notice as well that the four clusters of red nodes each receive their own branches in 
the topological summary.  
 
Figure 8: Topological Summary of Noisy Circle [Kraft, 2016, Figure 4.7] 
From Figure 9, sampled data points from a three-dimensional torus compose the point cloud data 
for the next example. These summaries use the SVD filter functions, Euclidean metric, single 
linkage clustering, and a balanced cover. Focusing solely on the point cloud data, some initial 
topological features include a hole enclosed by several data points and, overall, one connected 
component. Both topological summaries reflect these features, even though they use the same 
filter function with different parameters. The top and bottom networks exhibit a single-connected 
topological object and a single loop. 
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Figure 9: Summary for torus using first SVD (Top) and Summary for torus using second SVD (bottom)  
[Kraft, 2016, Figure 4.7] 
Of course, these examples illustrate the algorithms ability to capture essential topological 
features and shape, but the data sets so far have been synthetic data samples that reside in two or 
three dimensional space. The next section touches upon real-life data sets collected from both 
industry and medical practice.  
5.4.2 Real-life Applications 
 In the following studies, researchers apply the Mapper on real-world data. The first 
application pertains to a breast cancer study whose usage of Mapper led to the discovery of a 
new subgroup of breast cancer tumors. Data used for the study comprised of Nederlands Kanker 
Institut (NKI) data composed of 295 tumors, Breast Cancer Normal (BCN) data consisting of 13 
normal breast tissue samples, and data from Ulleval University Hospital (ULL) containing 46 
tumors and HERSCH containing 188 primary breast tumors [Nicolau, 2011]. In the last 
application of Mapper, the problem was determining indicators of loyalty for customers buying 
two brands of orange juice. The available data set came from a marketing study of customer 
purchases of orange juice at five supermarkets consisting of 1070 observations on 17 predictors 
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[Kraft, 2016]. These applications should showcase how the Mapper method can be adapted for 
data from various sources.  
 Since the purpose of topological data analysis is to provide a global representation of the 
data, incorporating Mapper into the analysis of breast cancer data assisted in addressing the high 
dimensionality of the biological data. The paper referred to the resulting method of analysis as 
Progression Analysis of Disease (PAD); PAD was the study’s “approach to the data analysis of 
disease that unraveled the geometry of data sets and provided an easily accessible picture of the 
data through Mapper and Disease-Specific Genomic Analysis (DSGA)” [Nicolau, 2011]. This 
new method added an additional level of pre-processing before running the data through Mapper; 
the preprocessing entailed transforming the breast cancer data set into new vectors highlighting 
specific properties. Defined by a mathematical method known as DSGA, the transformation 
measures the extent of deviation between diseased tissue and healthy tissue. By transforming the 
data using DSGA, the new data brings out unique biology, allows for wide variability of normal, 
and emphasizes the degree of deviation from healthy tissue [Nicolau, 2011]. Doing so, in other 
words, customized the Mapper algorithm to fit the nature of the medical data. Once the 
transformation of the data is completed, PAD applied filter functions provided by Mapper to the 
transformed data set; in this study, researchers defined filter functions that computed the vector 
magnitude of the Lp norm. Applying PAD on the NKI data formed the graph shown in Figure 10. 
Note that, since the filter function highlighted the deviation from normal, blue-colored nodes 
would pertain to normal and normal-like tumors; red-colored nodes, consequently, indicate that 
the deviation from healthy tissue is large. In this figure, there are two progression arms or paths 
that branch out from the blue nodes. The progression arm with red nodes, as discovered in the 
study, identified a new subgroup of “Estrogen Receptor-positive breast cancers that express high 
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levels of c-MYB and a high survival rate in patients” [Nicolau, 2011]. Even though this new 
subgroup does not fit into previously identified breast cancers and exhibit these properties, the 
researchers were able identify the subgroup only with the help of Mapper. The next application 
only reinforces the idea that the Mapper algorithm strives to highlight certain topological 
information.   
 
Figure 10: PAD Analysis of NKI data [Nicolau, 2011] 
 In this study concerning marketing research data, the goal of the study was to understand 
which factors influence a customer’s decision to purchase between two brands of orange juice, 
Citrus Hill (CH) or Minute Maid (MM). Some variables utilized within the study include sale 
prices for each brand, price differences, discounts offered, week of purchases, and loyalty of 
customers. An initial statistical approach using penalized logistic regression with L1 penalty 
concluded that good predictors for purchasing CH were loyalty to CH, price difference between 
MM and CH products, and an indicator variable for a specific store. This store was a good 
predictor for purchases because, according to the data, it offered more special offers and the best 
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sale prices for CH [Kraft, 2016]. The study then went onto to find predictors by using a 
combination of Mapper and penalized logistic regression to validate predictors from the previous 
approach and possibly find new predictors. Figure 11 shows the resulting topological summaries 
of the data set colored by first SVD filter function (left), by whether or not the purchase was CH 
(center), and by whether or not the purchase was MM (right). 
 
Figure 11: Initial Colorings of Topological Summaries [Kraft, 2016] 
Observing the center and right topological summaries, customers purchasing CH gathered on the 
right side of the graph whereas most customers purchasing MM were localized in the left branch. 
Notice that the two nodes in the dotted black circle have similar colorings in both summaries; 
comparing the two groupings concluded that MM customers in the right nodes possessed distinct 
purchasing reasons differing from MM customers in the left side. In fact, penalized logistic 
regression again selected loyalty to CH, price difference, and Store 5 as the best predictors that 
distinguish two nodes on the right from the left branch. Figure 12 illustrates the colorings by 
these predictors.  
 
Figure 12: Topological Summaries colored by LoyalCH (left), PriceDiff (center), StoreID5 (right). [Kraft, 2016] 
One interpretation gained by these colorings would be that, within the two nodes designated by 
the arrows, customers are moderately loyal to CH but choose to buy MM when the price 
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difference (sale price MM – sale price CH) is low [Kraft, 2016]. Additionally, observe the two 
nodes in the dotted circle. These colorings indicate that these nodes contain customers who are 
moderately loyal to CH and high price differences between CH and MM; alternatively, these 
customers prefer lower sale prices from CH. With Mapper, researchers from these studies were 
able to understand the data intuitively and, then, guide their efforts for further study. The next 
section discusses the cyber data involved. 
5.5 Cyber Data and Analytics 
 In this section, the main focus is on the cyber data available and the cyber analytics used 
in both filtering and validation of the data. The cyber data is a product of the BRAWL project; 
BRAWL is an abbreviation for Blue versus Red Agent War-game Evaluation. One goal of this 
project is to generate and collect real-time synthetic data from within a computer network. 
Pertaining to cyber analytics, another project involves collecting analytics that indicate malicious 
activity and to storing them in a repository.  
5.5.1 BRAWL Data 
 Data collected through BRAWL is synthetic data capturing the simulation of an intrusion. 
To summarize the procedure of BRAWL in a sentence, two teams of cyber agents compete 
against each other; the blue team handles detection of red team activity whereas the red team 
simulates an adversary gaining access to the system [Wampler, C., personal communication, July 
2016]. These games occur on a hyper-sensing network that generates data and records logs of 
network activity in real-time. BRAWL data is essentially information from Windows event logs 
and, thus, conforms to an XML-based schema in its raw form. After parsing and extracting 
information from the event logs, the data takes on a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) format 
because data in this format are easier to read row-by-row and process. The resulting data set 
contains as much as 153 fields; however, much of these fields repeat information and only 
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contribute to the distribution of missing data. Fields found in the data include log type, host 
name, severity, keywords, process ID’s, group ID’s, source port, destination port, image path, 
command line, parent information, integrity level, executables, and hashes. The data is a record 
of activity from the red and blue team agents as well as from normal users on the network. With 
a list of red team activity used as ground truth, identifying the red team agent activity was one 
goal of this project. 
5.5.2 Cyber Analytics and Analytics Repository 
 After each BRAWL cyber game, the output is a multitude of indicators that highlight 
malicious behavior or by-products of red team activity. Each indicator, also referred to as a cyber 
analytic, no matter how trivial or groundbreaking goes into the Cyber Analytic Repository 
(CAR) for further study and testing. While in storage, additional information is necessary to 
describe the new cyber analytic; such information pertains to likelihood of malicious activity, 
stage of development, and related ATT&CK technique (Appendix 4). All cyber analytics begin 
as ideas and, after testing and validation, go onto further stages of development or become 
refuted. The indicators highlighted in this paper include Powershell execution, processes 
spawning CMD.exe, and Server Message Block Write requests. See Table 3 for summaries of 
each available analytic. 
Cyber Analytic Summaries 
Analytic 1 Typically, when a user runs a command prompt (cmd.exe), the parent 
process is explorer.exe or another instance of the prompt. Spawning the 
process cmd.exe from certain parent like Microsoft Outlook may be 
more indicative of malice. 
Analytic 2 Detects Powershell scripts. Powershell is a scripting environment 
included in Windows that is an easy way to circumvent security 
measures. 
Analytic 3 Detects SMB Write Requests. SMB provides a means for remotely 
managing a file system. SMB Write indicates lateral movement to a 
host. 
Table 3: Analytic Summaries 
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5.5.3 Applying Mapper to Cyber Data 
 Implementing the aforementioned cyber analytics along with other analytics in the repository 
have accomplished the task of detecting red team intrusions, and most analytics in the repository have 
undergone improvements. The overall goal of applying the Mapper to this data was to gain qualitative 
understanding of the data from a different perspective. Rather than focus on a subset of the fields, the 
Mapper provides a global view of the data while still considering all the fields provided from the cleaned 
data set. Gunnar Carlsson, one of the researchers who co-founded Ayasdi and developed Mapper, stated 
that topological modeling can lead to taxonomy generation, hotspot outcome-based analysis, and 
geometry-based feature selection [Carlsson, 2015]. From this method, one desired outcome of applying 
Mapper was a taxonomy user activity or at least a distinction between malicious and benign user behavior 
on the network.  
6 Methodology 
 The overall goal of the project was to develop indicators of attack using Topological Data 
Analysis as well as to enhance the Python Mapper by designing a customizable base application to call 
Mapper functions. This chapter describes the design of the topological data analysis system, the 
cloud storage service that holds all the cyber data, and the case studies and their desired 
outcomes on the data. In addition, this chapter introduces the data analysis process that data 
scientists utilize when extracting generalizations and conclusions from the output of Mapper. 
The system overall consists of two layers of abstraction that begin with extracting data 
from a cloud storage service like ElasticSearch and ends with the analysis layer for the data. 
These two layers are referred to as the data extraction layer and the topological data analysis 
layer. As for the proposed experiments with the data, they consist of experimenting with filter 
functions, tweaking parameters within the TDA layer, and applying mapper on a different data 
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set. For the final section, most of the discussion pertains to the mathematical component of this 
paper. 
6.1 System Design 
 The Python Mapper implementation lacks two key aspects that limits the data analysis 
stage; these aspects are the ability to extract data directly from a source and the ability to analyze 
the data beyond creating visualizations. Extracting data directly from the source entails being 
able to take a subset from the data source, to clean it by removing any non-numeric attributes, 
and to package the cleaned data in a readable format such as a CSV-formatted file. Thus, 
integrating abstractions of these aspects with the implementation should improve its capability. 
Generally, for all following sections, the design aspect consists of brief descriptions of the 
classes involved. 
6.1.1 Data Extraction Layer 
 The main task of the data extraction layer is to pull in all requested data from a cloud and 
format the data into a readable file for the next layer, cleaning and parsing all the data in the 
process. In terms of structure, there are five main classes that include the ESManager class, File 
class, Parser class, JSONFile class, and CSVParser class. Both the File class and Parser class are 
parent classes for the JSONFile and CSVParser classes, respectively; the reason is that future 
versions of the system would have the freedom to implement additional format changes such as 
reading from a plain text file. Establishing a connection with the ElasticSearch cluster, querying 
for data, pulling the data are responsibilities of the ESManager. The ESManager is also 
responsible for reading in pre-configuration files containing server names or port numbers for 
designating the Elasticsearch cluster. As for the File and JSONFile classes, these classes have the 
task of reading in a data file formatted one way and outputting a file formatted according to user-
preference. Output from Elasticsearch uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), but the Mapper 
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toolchain requires Comma-Separated Values (CSV) format. Thus, the JSONFile class transfers 
the data to a CSV file as desired. The purpose of the Parser class and CSVParser class is to 
represent any non-numeric data as numerical values either by assigning integers for all possible 
values within a column or transforming each data point into a vector of continuous values. As 
with the file classes, the reason for using only numeric representations for the data is an 
implementation-specific requirement of the Mapper toolchain. Aside from structure, the process 
of data extraction follows five steps.  
 First, data extraction begins with an ESManager object pulling data from an 
ElasticSearch cluster. The output from this operation is, as stated before, a file formatted in 
JSON. Next, a JSONFile object would export all information from this file to a CSV-formatted 
file. A CSVParser object would then clean the data by removing extraneous columns or repeated 
columns from the file and parse the file. Again, parsing the file means assigning numerical 
values to all non-numeric data as well as categorical values like ID numbers. Finally, the last step 
in data extraction is compressing the cleaned and parsed CSV-formatted file into a .gz file. Now, 
the data would be ready for the next layer in the system, the topological data analysis layer. 
6.1.2 Topological Data Analysis Layer 
 The main purpose of this layer is to execute the steps in the Mapper algorithm and output 
both a visualization of the data and CSV-formatted files for further analysis. To accomplish this 
goal, the Mapper class inherits all methods from the mapper python module. The OutputManager 
class is responsible for showing a visualization for the data along with creating CSV-formatted 
files corresponding to each node in the visualization. In the first step of the procedure, the data 
analysis layer takes in an archived file (.gz extension) and reads in the data; as discussed in the 
algorithm, the system stores all the data points into a matrix. A Mapper object would go through 
all steps of the algorithm from filtering to clustering.  
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 One alternative way for implementing this TDA layer was to simply modify the source 
code for the Python Mapper, changing the GUI to incorporate more options and more filter 
functions. Instead, starting from scratch would be a more straightforward process since only 
certain methods from the mapper python module were required. In order to know which methods 
were necessary, the Python Mapper had a feature for generating standalone python scripts that 
would accomplish the same task as using its graphical user interface. Using these python scripts 
as a starting point would make the system more adaptive to future changes and allow integration 
to be more direct.  
6.2 ElasticSearch 
Originating from Windows Event Logs, the cyber analytic data had contained logs of 
process and user data recorded every second for the duration of a month. ElasticSearch, thus, was 
a suitable tool for searching through and storing this data. Essentially, ElasticSearch was a 
distributed search engine built for the cloud, providing features such as various API’s, long term 
persistency, full-text search in real time, and the functionality of Lucene [Dixit, 2016]. These 
features have attracted many large and small organizations to adopt ElasticSearch for not only a 
search tool but also a data storage tool. This section will discuss the inner workings of 
ElasticSearch by first introducing Lucene. 
6.2.1 Foundation of ElasticSearch: Lucene 
 Written in Java, Apache Lucene is a search engine library from which ElasticSearch 
inherits its functionality. ElasticSearch, as a result, is able to index documents and search them 
with its full text search capabilities [Dixit, 2016]. Before touching upon this functionality, there 
are a few terms to understand. A document is known as “the main data carrier used for indexing 
and search within ElasticSearch; alternatively, it is a JSON object that contains the actual data in 
key value pairs” [Dixit, 2016]. Having the data formatted in JSON allows for fast lookup 
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because one can reference values by keywords, similar to indexing in a Python Dictionary data 
structure or Hash table. Fields compose sections of documents, and they consist of a name and a 
value. Finally, terms are units of search representing a word from the text and a token represents 
“an occurrence of a term from the text of the field” [Kuc, 2015]. In other words, documents are 
containers of information, fields provide organization for the information held within documents, 
and terms are the indices involved in searching for documents.  
 Keeping those basic concepts in mind, one can now understand how ElasticSearch 
handles querying. Apache Lucene stores information using a data structure called inverted index; 
this data structure “maps the terms in the index to the documents” [Kuc, 2015]. As a result, the 
data in an inverted index relies heavily upon the terms rather than the documents, a major 
difference from relational databases. The process of mapping the data in the documents to the 
inverted index as well as changing the query text into terms for searching purposes is known as 
analysis in the realm of ElasticSearch. Analysis has an important role in indexing and querying. 
The analyzer, composed of a tokenizer and some number of filters, carries out this process. The 
tokenizer component has the responsibility of dividing the text from documents into tokens, 
preparing the tokens for filter processing [Kuc, 2015]. With Lucene at its roots, ElasticSearch is 
able to build upon these foundations and become not only a search tool but also a data storage 
tool. 
6.2.2 Key Concepts of ElasticSearch 
 To fully understand ElasticSearch, there are a few more concepts to learn in addition to 
documents, tokens, and terms. Utilizing a bottom-up approach, an index is the next concept in 
the structure of ElasticSearch architecture. An index is a “logical namespace under which 
ElasticSearch stores data and may be built with more than one Lucene index using shards” [Kuc, 
2015]. Similar to how data is read from and saved to databases, an index stores documents for 
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future queries. Shards, in turn, are containers that consist of Lucene segments; shards enable 
ElasticSearch to distribute the data within an index and allow for a vast amount of storage space. 
Moving up a level in the architecture, nodes represent a single instance of an ElasticSearch 
server where one or more shards can reside. Types of nodes include master nodes, data nodes, 
and tribe nodes. Finally, a set of ElasticSearch nodes is known as a cluster; with its distributed 
nature and the collaboration between clusters, ElasticSearch can manage a large volume of data 
and work done multimode clusters can go uninterrupted even during repairs or maintenance 
[Kuc, 2015]. The system for TDA will incorporate the capabilities of ElasticSearch with the 
Python Mapper in order for direct access to data. 
6.3 Data Scientist’s Workflow 
The main phases of the Data Analytics Lifecycle are discovery, data preparation, model 
planning, model building, communication of results, and operationalization [EMC, 2015]. As 
noted in an interview with an Ayasdi data scientist and various studies using Mapper, there is a 
similar workflow that data scientists from Ayasdi have adapted for interpreting Mapper’s 
constructed visualizations. This workflow begins with data conditioning and filtering and ends 
with topological summaries of the data; repeating the process can lead to gaining a better 
understanding of the data [Symonds, 2015]. The desired end result from following these steps is 
to uncover patterns and predictors for the given data.  
The first step before visualizing the data with the mapper is data preparation. Probably 
the most critical task or at least most labor-intensive, data preparation affects the next stages in 
data analysis because any data conditioning or data transforming would determine what patterns 
are shown in subsequent models or summaries. In fact, teams aside from Ayasdi have commonly 
spent 50% of a data science project’s time understanding the data and deciding how to represent 
the given information in a way that conforms to the requirements of the project [EMC, 2015]. A 
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good portion of the project was spent learning how to represent each data point as an event log 
from a host relaying messages within the network to the mapper. However, not all fields 
provided in the event log were necessary for data analysis. The attributes that would be good 
representatives of the data set were fields from the Data Model data structure.  
The Data Model was an organization of objects that encapsulate consistent fields 
throughout the event logs and possess both actions and specific fields. Some example objects 
included processes, flows, drivers, files, and modules. Note that fields associated with the data 
model object contained most if not all the information within the data set; the other fields 
duplicated this information. Although each data model object (e.g. flows or processes) had 
different actions and fields, the cleaned data set included all types of data model objects. In total, 
each point in the data set would consist of 47 fields of only data model fields, timestamp, and 
port number fields. In order to ensure that the amount of missing data after cleaning was much 
lower, the validation method selected was to pull four sample data sets and compare the 
percentage of blank cells in these samples with cleaned versions of the same four sample sets. 
Each sample set contained 500 data points from different time intervals. This method would 
quantify the amount of missing data in the process of cleaning.  
Understanding the underlying structure of the output was a challenge by itself, so any 
initial analysis resulted in more observations and questions rather than conclusions. Before 
starting the analysis process, the first step in the workflow was to select initial features from the 
data set. Then, using Mapper, the next step was to create topological summaries of the data based 
on the chosen features. Any non-trivial topological features like loops, flares, or connected 
components were significant features to highlight during analysis of the output. Additionally, any 
localizations of data points represented anomalous or interesting behavior. Afterwards, the next 
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and probably the most difficult step was to generalize the underlying reasons for both the 
structure of the output and the groupings of data points. Knowing the properties highlighted by 
the filter function also contributed to the understanding of the output. Once identifying the 
common features resulting from the localizations, the final steps were to utilize this information 
to develop a better topological summary and to repeat this process. The goal of the following 
case studies was to explore the cyber data and observe the Mapper implementation’s ability to 
represent the data. 
6.4 Case Studies with Data 
 Based on the numerous applications of TDA, the desired result with this data was a 
visualization that identified a distinction between malicious activity and benign events or a 
taxonomy of events on a network. To reach such a result required much experimenting with the 
data. Experiments consisted of changing filter functions, using a combination of filter functions, 
or even adjusting the parameters for each filter function.  
6.4.1 Continuous vs. Categorical 
As previously stated in the system design section, parsing of the data was either through 
enumeration of values within each column/attribute or by computing a vector of continuous 
values for each data point. By using both methods, the result was having two different data 
transformations on the original data set. Each would require its own measure of distance or 
similarity; for instance, the continuous values used Euclidean distance and data set with 
categorical data utilized the Hamming metric. In terms of filter functions, the case study would 
use the L-Infinity Eccentricity function in order to detect any data points distinct from the center 
of data. Comparing the resulting visualization should have indicated whether or not the Mapper 
algorithm was better equipped to finding malicious activity using only the enumeration or using 
another level of pre-processing.  
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6.4.2 L-Infinity vs. L-1 Filters 
 The difference between the L-Infinity and L-1 filter functions is that the L-Infinity 
function computes the maximum distance between a given data point and the center of data, 
whereas the L-1 filter function computes Euclidean distance between a given data point and the 
center. An alternative way to observe this difference is that the norm of a vector with p = 1 
differs from the infinity norm in a similar fashion. By comparing the output after filtering by 
both functions, there should be evidence supporting whether or not the L-1 filter overlooks any 
interesting groupings/topological features or vice versa.  
6.4.3 Experimenting with Resolution 
 Since the number of intervals and percentage of interval overlap affects the resolution of 
the data visualization, experimenting with these parameters would provide insight into how 
much of an impact these parameters have upon the output. Taking the resulting visualization 
from Figure 9, this brief case study focused on the 2-Torus because it is a well-known object 
studied in topology. Under the same filter and clustering method, the modifications to the 
parameters consist of increasing and decreasing only the intervals, increasing and decreasing 
only the overlap, and tweaking both parameters together. One possible outcome would be that 
decreasing the overlap should result in more disconnected components in the network.  
6.4.4 Applying Mapper to WBCD Data 
When testing the capabilities of the Mapper implementation, using the method on medical 
data seemed to be a good approach given its other applications in the field. The Wisconsin Breast 
Cancer Diagnostic (WBCD) data set was a good candidate since each data point had labels for 
ground truth and contained only real-valued features. Coming across the data set in Kaggle, there 
was already CSV-formatted file to parse on and allow the Mapper to process. There were 569 
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data points generated from 569 patients, 212 with cancer and 357 patients with fibrocystic breast 
masses (benign) [Wolberg, 1995].  
Features in the data included ID number, diagnosis (Boolean value for malignant or 
benign), and ten real-valued features computed from a digitalized image of a fine needle aspirate 
(FNA) of a breast mass. These ten features describe cell nuclei characteristics evident within the 
image; computed for each cell nucleus, they are radius, texture, perimeter, area, smoothness, 
compactness, concavity, concave points, symmetry, and fractal dimension [Wolberg, 1994 and 
Wolberg, 1995]. More information about these features can be found in both articles by W. H. 
Wolberg listed in the List of References, but essentially radius and area describe nuclear size of 
the cell and the rest refer to the nuclear shape. For each feature on each image, there is a mean, 
worst, and standard error value, resulting in a total of 30 features in addition to the ID number 
and diagnosis.  
In applying the Mapper method, 299 data points made up the testing set, consisting of 256 
benign points and 43 malignant points. The parameters involved were the Chebyshev metric, the 
Singular Value Decomposition filter function, and a balanced 1-dimensional cover. Coloring on 
different features showed how the method created groupings of the data. After finding these 
features, reading through relevant medical literature pertaining to this data set verified that these 
features were significant. The last step in this application of Mapper was to confirm any findings 
with a validation set composed of the remaining data points.  
6.5 Evaluation of Visualizations 
 Initial observations of the Mapper output could be confusing if not all factors are 
considered. Interpreting the visualization required understanding what the selected filter function 
conveys about the data, how transformations of the data change its meaning, how different 
colorings of the data may provide some insight into the data, and various other aspects. Since 
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working the synthetic cyber data had been an exploratory effort, evaluating the visualizations 
was a challenge, but there were three main aspects that determined whether or not the output was 
useful or meaningless. These aspects included localizations/groupings or malicious activity, 
number of significant topological features like loops or flares, and the persistence of shape 
evident in the visualization after a few perturbations in parameters.  
 For Mapper and other clustering methods, any localizations or groupings of red team 
activity would indicate that there were certain factors distinguishing them from normal user 
behavior; these factors/features would most likely be indicators of cyber-attack. Alternatively, if 
the chosen filter function highlighted the probability of malicious activity and the resulting 
visualization was able to group all adversarial activity in high-valued nodes, then that 
visualization should provide valuable insight into what are good cyber analytics for cyber threats. 
Thus, the accuracy or ability to create pure groupings within the visualization was an important 
component of a good visualization. 
 As previously stated about the Ayasdi data workflow, looking for topological features in 
the Mapper visualization would be essential in comprehending the meaning behind the shape of 
the data. These topological features may possibly highlight specific behavior within the data. 
Most notably, many applications of Mapper like the Breast Cancer study and study with diabetic 
patients have identified these special topological features to be loops (continuous circular 
segments) or flares (long linear segments) [Lum, 2013]. Loops in the Mapper output have 
typically inferred periodic behavior within the data. For example, a student used Ayasdi’s 
commercial product to represent four decades of macroeconomic and market data as a large 
circular loop; the student later discovered that this shape represented the economic cycle by 
identifying its distinct stages such as expansion, contraction, and recovery within the network 
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[Ramanan, 2016]. Flares, on the other hand, usually represent a taxonomy of subgroups within 
the data like in the Breast Cancer tumor study and market data study. Now, identifying 
topological features within the output composes a significant part of the analysis, but one must 
also validate the persistence of the feature.  
 The final method of evaluating a visualization was observing how the visualization 
changes after experimenting with the parameters. Such parameters included the number of 
intervals and the percentage of overlap. Increasing or decreasing the intervals controlled the 
resolution of the visualization, meaning that less intervals resulted in less nodes in the output but 
the nodes became larger. In contrast, more intervals led to several smaller nodes. Having a high-
resolution in the visualization could possibly allow the user to detect more topological features, 
but such features would be insignificant compared to some larger topological feature. 
Concerning overlap, this parameter controlled how much the intervals were allowed to intersect 
each other. An overlap greater than 50% could result in much denser visualizations where all 
nodes connect to more than one node, whereas an overlap less than 50% could lead to more 
disconnected networks. The next chapter will discuss the results of creating data visualizations 
based on the data sets and their evaluations. 
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7 Results 
 Before describing the work done on the cyber data and the output from the Python 
Mapper, note that this work has been largely exploratory so far and the following visualizations 
may not seem too interesting at first, but such is the nature of the methodology behind Mapper. 
The focus now is to highlight the progress of developing cyber analytics including work 
completed for data preparation and some initial case studies on the cyber data. Evaluation of the 
data visualizations will consist of the three components of a useful visualization described in the 
previous chapter.  
7.1 Minimizing Missing Data 
 As part of understanding data and the fields, one of the first steps to conditioning the 
cyber data was selecting the data model fields to keep consistency throughout the data set. Table 
4 and Table 5 show the results from the brief study described in the Methodology Chapter. 
Particularly, Table 4 displays the number of blank cells contained in the data before and after 
cleaning as well as the percentage of missing data of the whole data set. Each sample data set, 
originating from a simulation occurring from March 1, 2016 and March 2, 2016, had 230 
columns/fields and 500 data points, resulting in 115,000 cells in total. According to Table 5, the 
average percentage of blank cells before conditioning was 73.5% and the average percentage 
afterwards was 51.4%, an average drop of 22.1% in missing data.  
Missing Data Results 
 Subset1 Subset2 Subset3 Subset4 
Number of Blanks Cells (Before) 84291 84762 84238 84755 
Percentage of Blank Cells (Before) 73.296 73.706 73.25 73.7 
Number of Blank Cells (Cleaned) 12996 13266 12919 13206 
Percentage of Blank Cells (Cleaned) 50.964 52.023 50.662 51.788 
Percentage Difference 22.332 21.683 22.588 21.912 
Table 4 Missing Data Amounts and Percentages 
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Population Means and Std. Dev. 
Average Number of Blanks (Before) 84511.5 
Avg. Percentage of Blanks (Before) 73.5 
Average Number of Blanks (Cleaned) 13096.8 
Avg. Percentage of Blanks (Cleaned) 51.4 
Average Percentage Difference 22.1 
SDEV Number of Blanks (Before) 286.0 
SDEV Number of Blanks (Cleaned) 165.7 
SDEV Percentage of Blanks (Before) 0.249 
SDEV of Percentage Difference 0.407 
Table 5: Missing Data Means and Std. Dev. 
The data sets that trimmed off any non-data model field were left with 51 attributes where four 
of these fields held blank columns. Even so, missing values composed approximately half of data 
samples; the reason, again, was that each set contained various data model object that only 
possessed values for a distinct collection of fields. For example, flow object typically had values 
for IP address fields and port name fields. When transforming the data, the Data Extraction 
Layer section explains how it handles missing values. Aside from the percentage of missing 
values after conditioning, these results still reinforce the motivation to remove all fields except 
data model fields. 
7.2 Applying Mapper to WDBC Data  
The results from applying Mapper to this data set were good in terms of creating groupings 
of benign and malignant data points. Based on previous research and applications of mapper, 
flares or branches of one color typically indicated clear distinctions/groupings defined by the 
Mapper. With a one-dimensional balanced cover of 15 intervals and 50% overlap, Biggest Gap 
cut-off, and single-linkage clustering, the Mapper created a network (tree) of three flares. Figure 
13 shows this result, exhibiting how Mapper grouped all benign points in the right branch 
(shown in blue) and created two other branches for malignant data points (shown in red).  
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Figure 13:  Default Coloring (Left), Coloring by Diagnosis (Right) 
 After coloring the graph by each of the 30 features separately, three good features that 
colored the malignant and benign branches differently were the mean texture, worst area, and 
worst smoothness. Observe in Figure 14 that the branch containing benign data points have low 
values for the three features, whereas the other branches/flares have a combination of low and 
high values. In particular, the middle flare contains data points with high values for worst 
smoothness, but low values for the other two features. According to an article citing this dataset 
titled Computer-Derived Nuclear Features Distinguish Malignant from Benign Breast Cytology, 
an inductive machine learning model using these three features achieved a cross-validation 
classification accuracy of 97.5% [Wolberg, 1994].  
 
Figure 14: Coloring by Mean Texture (A), Coloring by Worst Area (B), and Coloring by Worst Smoothness (C)  
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Figure 15: Validation Set; Default Coloring (Left), Coloring by Diagnosis (Right)  
In addition to these three features, the branch containing benign data points had high values in 
the following features: Standard deviation Smoothness, Standard deviation Symmetry, and 
fractal dimension. Characteristics of the left branch (Figure 14) containing malignant points were 
high values for worst radius and worst parameter. 
In the validation set consisting of 270 data points, shown in Figure 15, there is a similar 
structure of three flares as in Figure 14. The resulting output has the same parameters as the 
previous figure; notice again that in the coloring by diagnosis, benign and malignant data points 
have been separated into different branches. However, in this case, the middle branch has a 
mixture of benign and malignant data points.  
7.3 Visualizations on Cyber Data 
 The data set utilized held 4,687 data points that recorded activity from both red team 
agents, blue team agents, and neutral hosts. Data points consisted of event logs that helped 
monitor the network for intrusions, credential escalation, logins, and error reports. For this 
simulation, there were in total 69 events where the red team agents were successful in carrying 
out an assigned task; these data points imitated malicious events on the network. However, only 
11 out of 69 red team data points appeared in the 4,687 data points. The following sections 
describe and evaluate visualizations using different filter functions and parameters on the cyber 
data set. 
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7.3.1 Continuous vs. Categorical  
 Since the fields in the data set were mostly composed of nominal data types like process 
ID’s or event codes, an initial visualization should check if malicious activity could be localized 
by the differences for each field. The first visualization utilized the L-Infinity eccentricity filter 
function with the Hamming metric and single-linkage clustering. For the resolution, this 
visualization used 60 intervals and 50% overlap. Figure 16 and Figure 17 exhibit the output from 
Mapper colored by default values, Analytic 1, Analytic 2, and Analytic 3. Knowing which data 
points were red team agents, the blue region on the left side of the network had no malicious data 
points. The turquoise region excluding nodes in the loops contained two processes executed by 
the same red team host. In the turquiose loops, there was a powershell command executed by the 
same red team host and a net command under another red team host. A net command, used in the 
command prompt, manages many aspects of a network. 3 unknown processes executed by red 
team agents and 6 powershell commands composed the malicious activity located in the yellow 
region. Finally, the orange region contained 1 unknown process under a red team agent and, 
specifically, the orange loop contained 1 powershell command.  
 
Figure 16: Default Coloring (Top) and Coloring by Analytic 1 (Bottom) 
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Overall, there were three loops in the output and 22 disjoint components located in the middle of 
the network. Also, notice that the coloring by Analytic 1 (Figure 16) and Analytic 2 (Figure 17) 
have a concentration of likely malicious activity in the corresponding turquoise region of the 
default coloring.  
 
Figure 17: Coloring by Analytic 2 (Top) and Analytic 3 (Bottom) 
 The next set of visualizations were from transforming each data point into continuous 
vectors whose components were based on some likelihood of malicious activity. As stated in the 
Case Studies with Data section, this transformation was a way to incorporate meaning to each 
data point instead of an enumeration of values. Each of these visualizations used a specific field 
as a filter function rather than any filters defined in the implementation. For example, 
considering the first visualization based on Analytic 1, the correspodning filter function would be 
a mapping between a data point and its score for Analytic 1. Again, the parameters included 60 
intervals, 50% overlap, and single- linkage clustering. 
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Figure 18: Coloring by Default (Top), Analytic 2 (Middle), and Analytic 3 (Bottom) 
Again, Analytic 1 detects processes that spawn a command prompt. Most notably, Figure 18 
shows that the visualization for Analytic 1 possesses two large circular loops and three other 
smaller loops. Reviewing the data points in the first large loop on the left side of the output, there 
were two unknown processes under two different red team host and 7 instances of non-malicious 
powershell commands. The second largest loop had 2 unknown processes by two different red 
team hosts and 2 net commands. For both smaller loops on the right side, there were no 
malicious data points. There were, however, 2 powershell commands by a red team agent in the 
smallest loop on the left.  
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Figure 19: Coloring by Default (Top), Analytic 1 (Middle), and Analytic 3 (Bottom) 
Next, Analytic 2 involved detecting powershell executions. Its resulting visualization had a 
similar structure to the first categorical visualization. The first large loop contained 2 unknown 
processes by two different red team agents, 1 net command instance, and 1 powershell execution. 
Both loops beside each other shared a red team data point and 1 instance of a powershell 
execution, but the smaller loop on the right had another powershell execution and another 
unknown process. As for the smaller loops on the right side of the graph, the first loop from the 
left held 2 unknown processes and 3 instances of net command whereas the last loop contained 
no malicious activity. Observing the red region in Analytic 2 visualization revealed that there 
were 3 red team powershell executions.  
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Figure 20: Coloring by Default (Top), Analytic 1 (Middle), and Analytic 2 (Bottom) 
Finally, this visualization pertained to Analytic 3; Analytic 3 had the purpose of detecting 
Session Message Block write requests. Figure 20 shows that there was 1 large loop and 4 other 
smaller loops scattered along the graph. Starting with the largest loop, there was only 1 instance 
of a powershell execution. Moving from right to left, the next loop contained 1 unknown process 
and a net command, whereas the third loop had 1 unknown process and 2 powershell executions. 
There was 1 net command in the fourth loop, but the fifth loop held no malicious data points. 
Concerning the red region of the default coloring, there were two instances of unknown 
processes under the same red team agent. One observation about the loops in all data 
visualizations was that the part of the loop with smaller nodes typically consisted of logins, 
logoffs, and processes spawned from a network monitoring program. Note that the network 
monitoring program, called Splunk, was not indicative of malicious activity. After comparing the 
categorical and continuous filters, the next step outlined in the Methodology chapter was 
exploring the difference in visualizations between eccentricity filters. 
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7.3.2 L-Infinity vs. L-1 Filter Functions 
 The visualizations for this section involved using both L-Infinity and L-1 eccentricity 
filters and comparing them to showcase any differences in structure or localizations of data. 
Pertaining to the transformed data used, only the categorical version of the cyber data by value 
enumeration was necessary for this case study. Intervals and overlap were fixed at 60 and 50%, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 21: Visualization using L1-Eccentricity Filter 
As one can see from Figure 21, the structure of the graph is different from the one found in 
Figure 16. There was only one loop in this visualization and the color scheme only goes from 
blue to light green; in contrast, the visualization in Figure 11 had four loops and its color scheme 
spanned the whole color spectrum (i.e. red to blue).  
7.3.3 Results for Modifying Parameters 
  The following graph outputs from Mapper were results for the brief case study of 
experimenting with intervals and the number of overlap amount. In addition to using sampled 
data points of 2-Torus, choices for filter function and metric remain the same as outlined in 
Section 4.4.1. Some features to observe would be that loops in the output mostly occur in the 
same colored regions where the single large loop in Figure 9 resided.  
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Figure 22: Visualization from Section 4.4 
 
Figure 23: Intervals: 30 and Overlap: 40% 
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Figure 24: Intervals: 10, Overlap: 40% 
From Figure 23 and Figure 24, these visualizations were the outcomes of increasing and 
decreasing the number of intervals. The increase in intervals seemed to have split the network 
into two components. Figure 24, in contrast, has remained as one connected component but has 
fewer nodes in the graph. 
 
Figure 25: Intervals: 18, Overlap: 80% 
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Figure 26: Intervals 18, Overlap: 20 
Exhibited in Figure 25 and Figure 26, the visualizations were showcasing the result of increasing 
and decreasing percentage overlap. Both graphs can be seen to be one connected component, but 
the visualization from Figure 25 is much denser as a result of the 80% overlap. The loop from 
the default parameters remained within the visualization from Figure 25 but does not appear with 
an overlap of 20.  
 
 
Figure 27: Intervals: 30, Overlap:10% 
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The purpose of this last visualization was observing the deviations from the original graph after 
increasing the intervals but decreasing the percentage overlap. Looking at Figure 27, one can 
clearly see that there are multiple connected components; two components that stand out were 
the blue and red subgraphs. After reviewing all of these data visualizations, one final observation 
from Figure 23, Figure 26, and Figure 27 would be that color regions where nodes branch off of 
each other are the same color regions where the loop occurs in the other visualizations.  
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
 After reading about the successes of the Mapper on various data sets, the visualizations 
based on the cyber data should have created distinct groupings of malicious and benign behavior 
or track malicious activity and lateral movement. The next steps afterwards should have been to 
interpret the underlying reason for that behavior and develop new cyber analytics. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the research, unfortunately, none of the analysis on the visualizations 
provided evidence of such phenomena. Any number of factors, like insufficient amount time 
spent on data preparation or inadequate choices in filter functions, could have led to this 
outcome. However, there were other findings and conclusions that resulted from progress done 
in the Results chapter.  
8.1 Finding 1: Fields Besides Data Model Can Be Removed 
 After analyzing the distribution of the missing data from four sample data sets of the 
same size, the conclusion was that the data set extracted directly from the cloud storage service 
could reduce its dimensionality further without loss of information. Removing any fields other 
than data model variables, timestamps, and port numbers would be one way of doing so. In 
addition to contributing to an approximate 22% drop in missing values in the data set, removing 
these fields would also rid the data of duplicated information. Another hidden benefit of leaving 
out these fields would be a reduction in waiting time for extracting the data from the cloud; not 
requesting for these fields would be an optimization decision.  
8.2 Finding 2: Similar Structures in Categorical vs. Continuous Comparisons  
 Similar to transformations in the Breast Cancer study, using the analytics to transform the 
data points into vectors of probabilities was a worthwhile data transformation. Going back to the 
data visualizations in the Results chapter, notice that they have similar structures in that each one 
has 3-4 loops. Each visualization had different filter functions that highlighted different 
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properties on the same data set, but there were loops in all of them with parameters for intervals 
and overlap fixed. Coincidence or not, the loops in each visualization confirm some cyclic 
behavior prevalent in the cyber data. What cyclic behavior specifically would require further 
analysis and a more time spent in data preparation.  
8.3 Finding 3: Loops in the Visualizations were not Indicators of Attack  
 Although the analytic-based visualization consisted of loops that contained some 
malicious data points, there were several other benign and noisy data points accompanying them. 
The data set had much fewer red team data points in comparison to the rest of the data. Even if 
malicious data points appeared in any of the loops, it was quite challenging to infer the 
underlying reasons as to why these point became grouped together. Thus, whether or not these 
circular loops represented any malicious behavior was inconclusive. However, the existence of 
these loops in all visualizations of the cyber data was significant. This notion of having fewer 
malicious data points leads to the next finding.  
8.4 Finding 4: Data Requires More Malicious Points 
 As stated in the previous finding, the number of normal user and blue team data points far 
outnumber the red team data points. Of course, this situation would replicate a real-world 
scenario where adversarial activity can be lost in a wave of network activity. However, the 
problem with this proportion of red team data to normal data was that any groupings of the data 
did not provide any evidence for a cyber analytic. Other applications of the Mapper noted in web 
blog posts by Gunnar Carlsson and Ramanan drew upon sufficient proportions of all possible 
subgroups within the data. For example, the data used to represent the economic cycle originated 
from Macroeconomic data spanning 1972 to 2015, touching upon different stages of the 
economic cycle. In order for the Mapper to incorporate similar localizations of malicious data 
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points, future applications of Mapper on cyber data should require more instances of malicious 
activity.  
8.5 Future Work 
 Future work should build upon the findings and work done in this project and progress 
towards developing cyber analytics for cyber threat intelligence. One direction for further study 
would the incorporation of machine learning into the Mapper workflow. In terms of filtering, a 
model trained using a machine learning algorithm and labeled cyber data can act as a filter 
function for assigning numerical scores to each data point based on likelihood of malicious 
intent. Of course, data preparation should entail labeling each data point on whether or not it was 
a blue team or red team member. Once new indicators of attack have been created from analysis, 
a new model trained using these indicators would act as part of a cyber detection system. 
Another idea for future work is developing a better data transformation that would highlight the 
purpose of each data point and its impact on the network. Although transforming the data into 
continuous vectors using available cyber analytics was interesting notion to experiment with the 
Mapper, this transformation was only one way of incorporating meaning into each data point   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Install Python Mapper Guide 
Requirements for Python Mapper 
 Python 2.6 or higher. The GUI needs Python 2 since it depends on wxPython and 
PyOpenGL; Python Mapper itself can be run under Python 2 and Python 3. Recommended to 
install pip if it is not already included in Python distribution. (Without pip, replace all 
instances of pip in the instructions with easy_install) 
 NumPy and SciPy 
 Matplotlib 
 Graphviz 
 Optionally, cmappertools (Mullner’s Python module written in C++) that replaces slower 
Python routines with fast, parallelized C++ algorithms.  
 Fastcluster is another Python module written in C++ for fast hierarchical clustering. 
Standard installation 
Simply type 
$ pip install mapper --user 
on a command line. If everything worked, you may stop here and start using Mapper. The steps 
below describe alternatives and optional steps. 
 
Windows Installation 
 
Here are step-by-step instructions to install Python Mapper and all its dependencies in Windows. 
If there are errors with rejected connections, look to the Troubleshooting section. Keep in mind 
that Python Mapper does not contain any platform-specific code and depends only on cross-
platform packages. 
1. Download and install Python 2. 
Go to https://www.python.org/downloads/windows/. Go to “Latest Python 2 Release”. 
Download the “Windows x86-64 MSI installer”. Start the installer and follow the 
instructions. 
2. Download and install wxPython from http://wxpython.org/download.php. Make sure to 
match your Python version and architecture (32/64bit). 
3. Download the Windows NumPy package 
from http://www.lfd.uci.edu/~gohlke/pythonlibs/#numpy. You’ll need the package later. 
Again, make sure to match your Python version and architecture. 
Note: Download version with 27 if Python 2.7, 34 if Python 3.4 
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4. Download the Windows SciPy package 
from http://www.lfd.uci.edu/~gohlke/pythonlibs/#scipy. 
Note: Download version with 27 if Python 2.7, 34 if Python 3.4 
5. Download and install Graphviz from http://www.graphviz.org/Download.php. 
6. Open a Command Prompt. 
7. The directory with the Graphviz executables must be appended to the PATH environment 
variable. There are lots of tutorials for this step in the internet, look at section below. 
(On my system, the directory is C:\Program Files (x86)\Graphviz2.38\bin.) 
8. Close the command prompt and open a new one to process the changes in 
the PATH variable. 
9. Check that the search path is configured correctly by typing: 
neato -? 
If Graphviz’s “neato” program responds with a help message, everything is alright. 
10.  Go to the Scripts folder in your Python installation, eg.: 
cd /d C:\Python27\Scripts 
11. Type: (If the following command does not work because of SSL certificates or rejected 
connection, include SSL certificates in C:\Python27\Lib\site-packages\pip\_vendor\requests) 
pip install wheel 
12. Install the downloaded NumPy and SciPy packages as follows: 
pip install C:\Users\MYUSERNAME\Downloads\numpy-A.B.C+mkl-cp2X-none-
win_amd64.whl 
pip install C:\Users\MYUSERNAME\Downloads\scipy-A.B.C-cp2X-none-
win_amd64.whl 
13. Install the remaining Python packages: 
pip install matplotlib 
pip install pyopengl 
pip install fastcluster 
pip install mapper 
pip install cmappertools 
14. The Mapper GUI should work now: 
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C:\Python27\Scripts\MapperGUI.py 
I recommend to always execute the GUI from the command line. This way, debugging 
information is displayed on the terminal if an error occurs. 
15.  Optional: You may want to add the Python Scripts directory to the search path, in the same way 
as you did it for Graphviz. On my system, it is C:\Python27\Scripts. This way, the Mapper GUI 
can be started by the command MapperGUI.py from any directory. 
Editing PATH variable for Windows: 
1. Go to My Computer > System Properties > Advanced System Settings > Click on 
Environment variables 
2. Look for Path in System Variables > Select > Click on Edit…  
3. To add in another path, append a semi-colon to the last entry and paste in the path to your 
desired directory (which contains .exe or other file). 
 
Installation: Ubuntu 
Note that installation has been tested with Ubuntu 14.04, 15.04, and 16.04. 
1. If you have not already done so, go to “System Settings” -> “Software and Update” and 
activate the item “Community-maintained free and open-sourced software (universe)” 
 
WARNING: The universe component is a snapshot of the free, open-source, and Linux 
world. It houses almost every piece of open-source software, all built from a range of public 
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sources. Canonical does not provide a guarantee of regular security updates for software in 
the universe component, but will provide these where they are made available by the 
community. Users should understand the risk inherent in using these packages.  
2. Open a terminal and enter the following commands: 
$ sudo apt-get install python-numpy python-scipy python-matplotlib python-
wxtools \ 
python-opengl python-pip graphviz libboost-all-dev 
$ pip install fastcluster --user 
$ pip install mapper --user 
$ pip install cmappertools --user 
3. Optional: Add the directory $HOME/.local/bin to the search path so that the Mapper GUI can 
be started more conveniently. 
To do so, open the file .bashrc in your home directory, e.g. by  
$ gedit ~/.bashrc 
and insert the following lines at the end: 
# set PATH so that it includes user's private bin if it exists 
if [ -d "$HOME/.local/bin" ] ; then 
    PATH="${PATH+$PATH:}$HOME/.local/bin" 
fi 
Now save the file and type 
$ source ~/.bashrc 
in the terminal window to read the modified file in. 
4. Try Mapper out by typing MapperGUI.py into the command line. 
 
Mac OS 
 There are no installation instructions for Mac OS as of October 2016 
 You can find installation tips at: http://danifold.net/mapper/index.html 
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Appendix 2 – User Guide for TDA System 
About 
The Mapper algorithm is a method for topological data analysis invented by Gurjeet Singh, 
Facundo Mémoli and Gunnar Carlsson. The Mapper method is the key part of a processing chain 
with (minimally) filter functions, the Mapper algorithm itself and visualization of the results. 
Python Mapper is a realization of this toolchain, written by Daniel Müllner and Aravindakshan 
Babu. It is open source software and is released under the GNU GPLv3 license.  
Elastic Mapper is a tool that incorporates automation to the Python Mapper. First, Elastic 
Mapper allows the user to pull data directly from a cloud storage service and parses the data into 
a readable-format for the Python Mapper. Then, Elastic Mapper outputs a visualization of the 
data where the user can interact with the nodes of the visualization; this interactivity is inherited 
from Python Mapper.   
Requirements 
 Python 2.7 or greater 
 Installation of Python Mapper allows this system to user Mapper module and wxPython 
module 
 Directories that should be Elastic Mapper’s working directory are Nodelist, DATA, 
ES_preconfig, and Mapper_preconfig 
 Python Mapper only accepts .gz files of CSV-formatted files (values within CSV files 
must all be float data types) 
Begin invoking the application by either double-clicking TDA_Sys_GUI.py or running 
TDA_Sys_GUI.py in the same directory with all the source code files. 
Data Extraction 
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Starting from Scratch 
1. In order to pull from the Elasticsearch cluster, either press on one of the pre-
configurations or press the Browser button to select another configuration for the 
parameters. User can also generate a blank configuration file and replace Null keywords 
with desired input. 
 
The parameters in the configuration files are parameters used to select the desired 
Elasticsearch server, desired cluster, and information used for querying results. 
Http – The node in Elasticsearch cluster to connect to. 
Port – port number of the host 
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Index – describes further where you are pulling data from 
Format – format you want the data in before preparing the data (Currently does not 
matter) 
Start_time – Beginning of the time interval of the data  
End_time – End of the time interval 
Is_continuous – Boolean variable for determining if you want the data parsed into 
continuous values 
Is_categorical – Boolean variable for determining if you want the data parsed into 
categorical but numerical values (Enumerating through all values and assigning a 
number)] 
2. Once configurations have been selected, press the Begin Data Extraction to begin pulling 
data from the cloud and storing all the data in CSV-formatted files. 
Beginning with clean data 
1. If you already have cleaned data set in CSV-formatted file (if in different format, be sure 
to define your own Parser object in the user_defined.py file), select the file by pressing 
the Browser button in the Immediate Parsing section. 
Important: Make sure that data file is in DATA directory 
2. Press Parse and the resulting file can be found in DATA directory. 
Mapper Layer 
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Starting from Scratch 
1. Select the Gzipped file of your parsed data. 
2. Select the original version of your dataset (The exact same dataset before parsing or 
cleaning). Otherwise, select a version of the dataset that provides you with the most 
meaning. For example, you can output node lists that contain the indices of the data 
points corresponding to the row in the CSV-file.  
3. Select metric, filter function, cutoff algorithm, and then press the Generate Params 
Config button. 
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4. Find the blank configuration file in the Mapper_preconfig directory and fill in the fields. 
The parameters that appear in this file depends on your choice in filter, metric, and 
clustering algorithm. 
 
Clustering – clustering algorithm for partial clustering in Mapper method 
Filter_info – filter function arguments 
Cover – Choice for various covers of the filter range. Choices include 
cube_cover_primitive and balanced_cover_1d. 
Overlap – The percentage of overlap between intervals 
Cutoff_params – Parameters for the cutoff algorithms 
Intervals – Number of intervals to partition the range, controls resolution. 
5. Select the new configuration file by pressing the Browser button under the Mapper 
Parameters Section 
6. Press Perform Mapper button to begin the process of running the Mapper algorithm and 
outputting a visualization. 
Quick Start 
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1. Press either Mapper Param 1 or Mapper Param 2 to select preconfigured parameters. 
You may also use these pre-configurations as examples. Mapper Param 1 locks in the 
Euclidean metric, Eccentricity filter, and Big Gap 2 cutoff. Mapper Param 2 fixes the 
same parameters to the same values except for choice in filters; Mapper Param 2 fixes its 
filter to the Singular Value Decomposition function.  
 
Figure 28: Mapper Parameter Configurations, Mapper Param 1(Top) and Mapper Param 2 (Bottom)  
2. Press Perform Mapper button. 
Analysis 
After beginning the Mapper algorithm, the system carries out two tasks. First, the system stores 
CSV-formatted files composed of data points for all nodes in the visualization; the user can look 
at the data points residing in a specific node. In the Mapper Output Window, the user can also 
select a single node or a group of nodes and save the corresponding node list to some directory.   
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